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Why  Doesn't  the  United  States  Have 
a  European-Style  Welfare  State? 
EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS REDISTRIBUTE income  among  their  citizens  on 
a much  larger  scale than  does the U.S. government.  European  social pro- 
grams  are  more  generous  and  reach  a larger  share  of citizens.  European  tax 
systems are more  progressive.  European  regulations  designed  to protect 
the poor  are  more  intrusive.  In this paper  we try  to understand  why. 
The literature  on the size of government  is rich and  varied.  However, 
here  we do not focus on the size of government  as such,  but  rather  on the 
redistributive  side of government  policies. Thus  our goal is in one sense 
narrower  than  answering  the question,  "What  explains  the size of govern- 
ment?"  since we focus on a single, but  increasingly  important,  role of fis- 
cal policy.  Yet  in another  sense our  focus is broader,  because  redistributive 
policies go beyond  the government  budget-think, for instance,  of labor 
market  policies. 
We consider  economic,  political,  and  behavioral  explanations  for these 
differences  between  the United  States  and  Europe.  Economic  explanations 
focus on the variance  of income  and  the skewness  of the income  distribu- 
tion  before  taxes  and  transfers,  the social  costs of taxation,  the  volatility  of 
income, and expected changes in income for the median  voter.  We con- 
clude that  most of these theories  cannot  explain  the observed  differences. 
We are grateful  to our  discussants  for very useful suggestions.  We also thank  William 
Easterly,  Benjamin  Friedman,  Michael  Mandler,  Casey  Mulligan,  Roberto  Perotti,  Andrei 
Shleifer,  Theda  Skocpol,  and  a large  number  of conference  participants  for  very  useful  com- 
ments.  We thank  the National  Science Foundation  for financial  assistance  through  a grant 
with  the  National  Bureau  of Economic  Research.  Amaud  Devleeschauwer  and  Jesse  Shapiro 
provided  excellent  research  assistance. 
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Before-tax  income in the United States  has both a higher  variance  and a 
more  skewed  distribution.  There  is no evidence  that  the deadweight  losses 
from  taxation  are lower in Europe.  And the volatility  of income appears 
to be lower in Europe  than  in the United States.  However,  there  is some 
possibility  that  middle-class  households  in the  United  States  have  a greater 
chance  of moving up in the income distribution,  which would make the 
median  voter  more  averse  to redistribution. 
Political  explanations  for the observed  level of redistribution  focus on 
institutions  that  prevent  minorities  from gaining political power or that 
strictly  protect  individuals'  private  property.  Cross-country  comparisons 
indicate  the importance  of these  institutions  in limiting  redistribution.  For 
instance,  at the federal  level, the United  States  does not have  proportional 
representation,  which  played  an  important  role in facilitating  the  growth  of 
socialist parties  in many  European  countries.  America  has strong  courts 
that  have  routinely  rejected  popular  attempts  at redistribution,  such  as the 
income  tax or labor  regulation.  The European  equivalents  of these courts 
were swept away as democracy  replaced  monarchy  and  aristocracy.  The 
federal  structure  of the United States  may have also contributed  to con- 
straining  the role of the central  government  in redistribution. 
These political  institutions  result  from  particular  features  of U.S. his- 
tory  and  geography.  The formation  of the United  States  as a federation  of 
independent  territories  led to a structure  that  often  creates  obstacles  to cen- 
tralized  redistributive  policies.  The  relative  political  stability  of the United 
States  over more  than  two centuries  means  that  it is still governed  by an 
eighteenth-century  constitution  designed  to protect  property.  As world  war 
and revolution uprooted  the old European  monarchies,  the twentieth- 
century  constitutions  that  replaced  them  were  more  oriented  toward  major- 
ity rule, and less toward  protection  of private  property.  Moreover,  the 
spatial  organization  of the United States-in  particular,  its low popula- 
tion density-meant that  the U.S. government  was much  less threatened 
by socialist revolution.  In contrast,  many of Europe's  institutions  were 
established  either  by revolutionary  groups  directly  or by elites in response 
to the threat  of violence. 
Finally,  we discuss reciprocal  altruism  as a possible behavioral  expla- 
nation  for redistribution.  Reciprocal  altruism  implies  that  voters  will dis- 
like giving money to the poor if, as in the United States, the poor are 
perceived  as lazy.  In contrast,  Europeans  overwhelmingly  believe  that  the 
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poor  are  poor  because  they  have  been  unfortunate.  This  difference  in views 
is part  of what  is sometimes  referred  to as "American  exceptionalism."I 
Racial  discord  plays  a critical  role  in determining  beliefs about  the  poor. 
Since racial minorities are highly overrepresented  among the poorest 
Americans,  any income-based  redistribution  measures  will redistribute 
disproportionately  to these minorities.  Opponents  of redistribution  in the 
United States  have regularly  used race-based  rhetoric  to resist left-wing 
policies. Across countries,  racial  fragmentation  is a powerful  predictor  of 
redistribution.  Within  the United  States,  race  is the single most important 
predictor  of support  for welfare. America's troubled  race relations are 
clearly  a major  reason  for the absence  of an  American  welfare  state. 
The Size and Structure of Redistributive  Policies in the 
United States and Europe 
In this section we review the basic facts about  the level of redistribu- 
tion to the poor  in the United  States  and  Europe. 
Government Spending 
Table 1 summarizes  the magnitude  and composition of government 
spending  in Europe  and  in the United  States,  using data  from  the Organi- 
zation  for Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD).  In addition 
to reporting  averages  for the countries  in the European  Union,  we provide 
separate  data  on the United  Kingdom  (the  one EU country  with  a relatively 
small government),  Germany  (the largest  EU country),  Sweden (as the 
prototype  of a country  with an especially  large  welfare  state),  and  France. 
General  government  spending  in the countries  in the European  Union 
averages  48 percent  of GDP;  it is 38 percent  in the United  Kingdom  and 
60 percent  in Sweden.  General  government  spending  in the United  States 
is smaller than any of these, at 36 percent  of GDP.  The composition of 
spending  is also instructive.  The largest  differences  between the United 
States  and  Europe  are  in transfers  to households  (including  social security) 
and subsidies. In fact, the sum of these two categories of spending is 
almost  twice as large,  as a share  of GDP,  in Europe  as in the United  States 
1.  Lipset (1996). 
This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Sat, 7 Jun 2014 14:37:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions190  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:2001 
Table 1. Composition  of General Government  Expenditure,  1999a 
Percent  of GDP 
Consumption  Transfers 
Goods  Wages  and other 
and  and  social  Gross 
Country  Total  services  salaries  Subsidies  benefitsb  investment 
United  States  35.1  5.1  9.2  0.3  10.7  3.4 
European  Unionc  47.9  8.4  12.0  1.5  18.1  2.8 
France  51.0  10.0  13.7  1.3  20.1  3.0 
Germany  47.4  10.7  8.3  1.7  20.5  1.8 
Sweden  60.2  10.3  16.7  2.0  21.1  2.5 
United  Kingdom  38.3  11.0  7.4  0.6  15.7  1.0 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on data  from  OECD Economic  Outlook  database,  no. 68, 2000 (see appendix  B for details). 
a.  Details may not sum to totals because of excluded categories. 
b. Includes social security. 
c.  Simple average  for fourteen  EU countries  (excludes Luxembourg). 
(20 percent  versus 11 percent).  The difference  in transfers  and subsidies 
accounts  for 9 percentage  points  of the 12-percentage-point  difference  in 
total  spending.  Consumption  of goods  and  services  and  government  wages 
are also higher  in Europe,  but  the difference  relative  to the United  States 
is much  smaller  than  that  for  transfers.  Public  investment  is actually  higher 
in the United States than  in the average  EU country.  Of course,  military 
spending  is higher  in the United  States  than  in Europe  (data  not shown), 
even today  when  U.S. defense  spending  is low by post-World  War  II stan- 
dards.  Western  Europe  since  World  War  II has been a free  rider  on defense 
provided  by the  United  States.  If the United  States  had  spent  less to defend 
Western  Europe  and itself from the Soviet threat,  the difference in the 
overall  size of government  would  be even larger. 
The OECD  offers a different  breakdown  of government  social spend- 
ing; these data  are  presented  in table  2 for 1995, the latest  year  for which 
they  are  available.  In all categories  except  health,  the United  States  spends 
a smaller  proportion  of GDP than  the European  average.  The differences 
are  particularly  large  in family  allowances  and  unemployment  compensa- 
tion and  other  labor  market  programs.  By this accounting,  social spend- 
ing in the United States was 16 percent of GDP in 1995, whereas the 
European  average  was 25 percent.2 
2.  Total  social spending  in table 2 is not meant  to coincide with the item "Transfers 
and  other  social benefits"  in table 1. Apart  from  the fact that  the two tables  refer  to differ- 
ent years, the definitions  of the two items differ.  For instance,  health benefits  in table 2 
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Table 2.  Government  Expenditure  on Social Programs,  1995 
Percent of GDP 
Old-age, 
disability,  Unemployment 
and  and labor 
survivors'  Family  market  Health 
Country  Total  benefits  benefits  programs  benefitsa  Otherb 
United States  15.8  7.3  0.6  0.6  6.3  1.0 
European Unionc  25.4  12.4  2.1  3.2  5.9  1.8 
France  30.1  14.1  2.6  3.1  8.0  2.3 
Germany  28.0  12.5  2.0  3.7  8.1  1.6 
Sweden  33.0  14.8  3.9  4.7  5.9  3.8 
United Kingdom  22.5  10.6  2.4  1.3  5.7  2.5 
Source: Authors'  calculations based on data from OECD Social Expenditure  database, 1999. 
a.  Also includes inpatient  care, ambulatory  medical services, and pharmaceutical  goods. 
b. Includes expenditure  on occupational injury  and disease benefits, sickness benefits, housing benefits, and benefits to low- 
income households. 
c.  Simple average  for the fifteen EU countries. 
Consider  the other  non-European  OECD  countries  (not shown in the 
tables).  The size of government  in Canada  (46 percent  of GDP)  is similar 
to that  in France  and  slightly  below the European  average.  Japan  and  Aus- 
tralia  have governments  that are smaller  than Canada's  (42 and 36 per- 
cent of GDP) but still slightly larger  than  the U.S. government,  whereas 
New Zealand's government,  at 41 percent of GDP, is roughly midway 
between  those of the United  States  and  Europe.  The average  for the non- 
European,  non-U.S. OECD countries falls somewhere in between the 
United States and Europe. Thus, in comparing  the United States and 
Europe,  we are  comparing  two extremes  in the OECD  group. 
Differences in the overall size of government  or even in the size of 
transfer  programs  are only indirectly  related  to the extent of redistribu- 
tion from the rich to the poor. For instance, the social security system 
involves flows from the young to the old as well as from the rich to the 
poor.  Nevertheless,  it is uncontroversial  that  a predominant  share  of public 
goods, and  especially  transfers,  favors  the poor  disproportionately. 
The Structure of Taxation 
Table  3 summarizes  the composition  of government  revenue  in Europe 
and  the United  States.  The most striking  differences  are  in social security 
includes  the wages of government workers in the health sector, which would be included 
under "Wages and salaries" in tab.e 1. 
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3. 
Composition 
of 
General 
Government 
Revenue, 
1999 
Percent 
of 
GDP 
Tax 
revenue 
Direct 
taxes 
Social 
security 
Property 
Goods 
and 
Nontax 
Country 
Total 
Total 
Households 
Businesses 
contributionsa 
income 
services 
revenueb 
United 
States 
31.0 
15.1 
12.4 
2.8 
7.1 
1.0 
7.7 
7.2 
European 
Unionc 
45.4 
15.3 
11.8 
3.4 
13.6 
2.0 
14.4 
5.7 
France 
50.4 
12.2 
9.5 
2.7 
19.3 
2.8 
16.0 
4.9 
Germany 
44.5 
12.0 
10.3 
1.5 
19.6 
0.7 
12.2 
9.9 
Sweden 
57.9 
22.4 
19.0 
3.3 
14.7 
3.8 
17.0 
8.1 
United 
Kingdom 
40.4 
16.3 
12.5 
3.8 
8.0 
2.1 
14.0 
4.0 
Source: 
Authors' 
calculations 
based 
on 
data 
from 
OECD 
Economic 
Outlook 
database, 
no. 
68, 
2000; 
and 
OECD, 
Revenue 
Statistics 
1965-1999, 
2000. 
a. 
Includes 
other 
current 
transfers. 
b. 
Data 
are 
for 
1997. 
c. 
Simple 
average 
for 
fourteen 
EU 
countries 
(excludes 
Luxembourg). 
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contributions  and  taxes on goods and  services.  However,  there  are  impor- 
tant  differences  in the structure  of taxation  even within  Europe.3  Our  con- 
cern  here  is with the tax burden  of the rich relative  to that  of the poor.  To 
calculate  a precise  measure  of the  progressivity  of the  tax system  across  all 
these countries  would  require  an entire  paper  (at least) devoted  to unrav- 
eling the intricacies of the different  tax codes. Although such a task is 
beyond  the scope of this paper,  a simple attempt  is made  in figure 1. We 
assembled  data  on the  different  income  tax  brackets  of the European  coun- 
tries and took a cross-country  average.  We then subtracted  this average 
from  the corresponding  federal  income  tax brackets  in the United  States; 
figure  1 plots that  difference.  Thus,  for a given level of income,  a positive 
value in the figure  implies that  the marginal  tax rate  in the United  States 
exceeds  the European  average,  and  a negative  value  indicates  the opposite. 
The figure shows that  marginal  tax rates  in the United States are higher 
than  in Europe  for  low levels of income  (up  to about  50 percent  of the aver- 
age worker's  wage) and  lower for higher  levels of income.  Also, the dif- 
ference  between  the United  States  and  Europe  becomes  larger  in absolute 
value as income  rises. In short,  the income  tax system  is much  more  pro- 
gressive  in Europe  than  in the United  States.4 
Historical Trends in the Size of Government 
Understanding  the reasons  for these striking  differences  between the 
United  States  and  Europe  requires  that  we know something  of the history 
of redistribution  in both  regions.  In particular,  we want  to know  when  the 
size of government,  and  especially  the size of the welfare  state  in Europe, 
diverged  from that  in the United States.  Did the two share  a similar  size 
of government  for a while and  then  diverge,  or has the difference  always 
been present? 
Table  4 provides  a clear  answer:  from  the very  beginning  of the expan- 
sion of the public sector  in the late nineteenth  century,  the United States 
and Europe show very distinct patterns.  Although the ratio of welfare 
3.  In fact, a hotly debated issue within the European Union is precisely the harmoniza- 
tion of tax structures across members. 
4.  In other countries with federal systems,  such as Germany, the structure of taxation 
also entails automatic redistribution from richer to poorer regions. This is not so, or at least 
not to the same extent, across U.S. states. Some geographical redistribution does, however, 
occur within  school  districts  in the United  States.  See  Oates (1999)  and the references 
cited therein. 
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Figure 1. Difference  between  U.S. and EU Marginal  Income  Tax Rates, 1999-2000a 
Percentage  points 
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Income  (percent  of average  production  worker  wage) 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based on data  from OECD, Taxing  Wages,  1999-2000, 2001. 
a.  Years are fiscal years. U.S. marginal  income tax rate minus a simple average of rates for fourteen  EU countries (excludes 
Denmark)  at each income level. 
spending was already high at the end of the nineteenth century, the 
absolute difference grew as the welfare state expanded  both in Europe 
and  in the United  States,  especially  in the 1960s and 1970s.  The observa- 
tion that  the difference  is of long standing  is important,  because  it allows 
us to exclude explanations  of the difference  that  are specific to a certain 
period  or event. 
Income Support Policies and Safety Nets 
In addition  to the aggregate  data  provided  above,  it is useful  to compare 
specific programs  for income support  and safety nets. We consider  Ger- 
many,  Sweden, and the United States, and we focus on a representative 
household.  We determine  the extent  to which  existing  programs  and  their 
provisions can be beneficial to such a household when it experiences 
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Table  4.  Government  Expenditure  on Subsidies  and Transfers,  187O-1998a 
Percent of GDP 
Country  1870  1937  1960  1970  1980  1998 
United  States  0.3  2.1  5.0  7.5  10.4  11.0 
European  Unionb  0.9  6.8  10.7  13.2  17.9  19.0 
France  1.1  7.2  14.1  14.9  18.4  21.5 
Germany  0.5  7.0  13.7  15.4  20.4  22.1 
Sweden  0.7  ...  8.1  12.1  21.1  23.8 
United Kingdom  ...  10.3  9.2  ...  ...  16.4 
Memorandum: 
Difference, EU-U.S.  0.6  4.7  5.7  5.6  7.6  7.8 
Source:  Authors' calculations based on data from Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) and OECD Economic Outlook database, 
no. 68, 2000. 
a. Or the closest year for which data are available. 
b.  Simple average of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom. 
increased  hardship.  We  examine  the costs of raising  a child,  of sickness,  of 
disability,  and  of extreme  poverty  (see appendix  B for data  sources).  We 
discuss  unemployment  policies in the context  of more  general  labor  mar- 
ket regulations  in the next subsection. 
Our  representative  household  is composed  of two adults  and  two chil- 
dren.  The adults,  both aged thirty-five,  are average  production  workers 
with fifteen years of work experience. The two children  are aged eight 
and  twelve, to take  a benchmark  often used by social security  administra- 
tions.  The  monthly  before-tax  earnings  of an average  production  worker  in 
the three  countries,  in 1999 dollars  adjusted  for purchasing  power  parity 
(PPP),  are  $2,498 in the United  States,  $2,561 in Germany,  and  $1,880 in 
Sweden. 
FAMILY BENEFITS.  Child benefits are available  in Germany  and Swe- 
den for every parent,  without regard  to income, until the child reaches 
eighteen (in Germany)  or sixteen (in Sweden), but those limits can be 
extended if the child pursues higher education. By contrast, family 
allowances  do not exist in the United  States.5  However,  special  allowances 
for children  of low-income families are allocated  under  the Temporary 
Assistance  for Needy Families  program  (TANF,  which  replaced  the  Aid to 
Families  with Dependent  Children,  or  AFDC,  program  in the mid-  1990s), 
as discussed  below. To summarize,  each child entitles the representative 
5.  The United States does have a fixed child tax credit ($600  per child in 2001),  and 
the amount of the earned income tax credit increases with the number of children in the fam- 
ily (but is available only to low-income  workers). 
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household  to monthly  benefits (again in 1999 PPP-adjusted  dollars) of 
$136 in Germany,  $87 in Sweden,  and  zero in the United  States. 
HEALTH CARE. The public health  care systems of Germany  and Swe- 
den also differ  significantly  from  that  of the United  States.  Both Germany 
and Sweden  provide  universal  coverage,  with unlimited  benefits  includ- 
ing payments  of doctors'  fees, hospitalization,  and  the cost of pharmaceu- 
tical products. The United States, on the other hand, relies on two 
programs,  Medicare  and Medicaid,  which target  mainly the elderly and 
low-income  households,  respectively.  If one of the members  of our  repre- 
sentative  U.S. family  became  sick and  had  to visit a doctor  or stay  in a hos- 
pital,  he or she would  not  be eligible  for  public  funds  or services  (although 
a large  fraction  of employers  offer health  insurance  as part  of their  com- 
pensation  package). In contrast,  the representative  German  or Swedish 
household  would  have  most  of these  expenses  covered  by the  public  health 
care program.  A small part  of the cost is borne  by the household  in the 
form  of a deductible.  In Germany  the household  pays a deductible  of $9 
for each  day  of hospitalization;  in Sweden  the  hospitalization  deductible  is 
$8, and in addition  there  is a deductible  of $10 to $14 for medical  treat- 
ment,  again  in 1999 PPP  dollars. 
SICKNESS  AND  ACCIDENTAL  INJURY BENEFITS.  Sickness benefits are 
intended  to replace  the loss of earnings  due to sickness of a household's 
income  earners.  Once  again,  the coverage  and  the extent  of benefits  differ 
radically  between  the  United  States  and  the  two European  countries  exam- 
ined here. Indeed,  only five states  in the United States offer any kind of 
sickness  benefit  (there  is no federal  benefit),  whereas  German  and  Swedish 
legislation  guarantees  benefits  for all persons  in paid employment;  these 
benefits  replace  up to 70 percent  and  80 percent  of gross  earnings,  respec- 
tively.  If the head  of our  representative  U.S. household  fell sick (and  was 
fortunate  enough  to live in one of the five states  that  offer sickness  bene- 
fits), he or she would receive (in 1999 PPP dollars) between $452 and 
$1,576 a month (between 18 and 63 percent  of the average  wage); the 
representative  household  head  in Germany  would  receive  $1,793 a month, 
and his or her Swedish counterpart  would receive $1,504 a month.  The 
U.S. household's  benefits  would last for a maximum  of fifty-two  weeks, 
whereas  those of the German  household  would  expire  only after  seventy- 
eight weeks,  and those of  the Swedish household could continue 
indefinitely. 
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Accidental  injuries  occurring  in the enterprise  or in connection  with  the 
working situation of the employee are covered in all three countries, 
including  every  state  in the  United  States,  and  these  benefits  are  quite  com- 
parable.  German  and  Swedish  workers  who suffer  on-the-job  injuries  see 
their income replaced according  to the amounts  allocated by sickness 
benefits,  whereas  American  workers  receive  the  equivalent  of two-thirds  of 
their  average  weekly earnings,  up to a maximum  of $270 to $714 a week, 
depending  on the state. 
DISABILITY  BENEFITS.  All three countries also have provisions to 
replace  income  lost due to inability  to engage in any gainful  activity.  Par- 
ticipation is compulsory  in all three systems, and coverage is based on 
work  history.  The United States and Germany  require  at least five years 
of employment before a worker can receive benefits; in Sweden the 
requirement  is three  years.  But the extent  of coverage  differs  dramatically 
across the three countries. Whereas  in the United States the disability 
pension  is based on the worker's  average  monthly  earnings,  the Swedish 
scheme provides a basic minimum  pension, augmented  by an income- 
based  supplementary  pension,  care  allowances,  and  handicap  allowances; 
German  pensions  are  computed  using the level of income  and  the number 
of years of contribution.  For the representative  production  worker,  dis- 
ability  benefits  amount  to $1,063 in the United  States  and  $1,504 in Swe- 
den (again in 1999 PPP dollars). These correspond  to 43 percent and 
80 percent  of the average  wage, respectively. 
POVERTY RELIEF. In all three  countries,  certain  government  programs 
are directed  at persons  who are unable  to support  themselves  but are not 
covered under  the schemes described  above. These persons may fail to 
meet eligibility  criteria  because  of insufficient  past  contributions,  or their 
incomes  may be too low to allow them  to take  part  in insurance  schemes. 
The programs  that provide these pure cash transfers  differ in structure 
across the three countries.  Germany  and Sweden rely on unlimited  and 
unconditional  plans (called Sozialhilfe and Socialbidrag,  respectively), 
which are  meant  primarily  to alleviate  poverty.  Additional  plans  covering 
the costs of housing  and  heating  are also available  for German  residents. 
The  United  States,  on the other  hand,  offers  an array  of plans  targeting  dif- 
ferent  groups  in the population.  Supplemental  Security  Income  (SSI) tar- 
gets aged, blind, and disabled  persons with annual  gross income below 
about  $14,500; the federal  payment  can be augmented  by a state supple- 
This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Sat, 7 Jun 2014 14:37:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions198  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:2001 
ment.  The  TANF  program,  mentioned  above,  is limited  to two  years  of assis- 
tance;  recipients  who are  able  to work  must  find  employment  at the end of 
that  period.  Other  plans,  such  as those  for food and  nutrition  assistance  and 
those  for housing  assistance,  also provide  relief  to low-income  households. 
A  representative U.S.  household that has zero income and has 
exhausted  all other  claims  to regular  benefits  could be eligible for $1,306 
in monthly  benefits  under  these  programs  ($726 from  SSI, or 29 percent  of 
the average  monthly  wage,  and  $580 from  TANF,  or 23 percent  of the  aver- 
age wage).6  Its German  counterpart  would  be eligible to receive  $1,008 a 
month,  and  its Swedish  counterpart  $892 a month  (39 percent  and  47 per- 
cent of the average  wage, respectively,  again in 1999 PPP-adjusted  dol- 
lars). These amounts  do not include benefits available  under  additional 
programs  such as housing  allowances. 
Labor Market Policies 
Not all redistributive  policies  involve  government  expenditure.  Legisla- 
tion in several other areas also determines the degree of government 
involvement  in redistributing  income.  An obvious  case is that  of labor  mar- 
ket  policies.  Labor  regulations  such  as those  that  set a minimum  wage  may 
keep  real  wages  higher  than  they  would  be otherwise.7  Table  5 summarizes 
the available  data  on minimum  wages  in Europe  and  the  United  States.  The 
data  are  from  several  different  sources,  but all tell a very similar  story.  In 
the  European  Union  the  minimum  wage is 53 percent  of the average  wage, 
against  39 percent  in the United States. In France  the minimum  wage is 
around  65 percent  of the average  manufacturing  wage, compared  with 
36 percent  in the United  States. 
Table 6 reports  various other measures of labor market  regulation, 
using data  assembled  by Stephen  Nickell and  Richard  Layard.8  Although 
a fair  amount  of variation  is observed  within  Europe,  on all measures  the 
United  States  scores  lower  (often  much  lower)  than  the European  average. 
The first column of the table reports  an index compiled by the OECD 
that  combines  several  aspects  of legislation  designed  to protect  workers  in 
6.  This value refers to the state of Massachusetts, which pays the highest TANF benefits 
among states in the program. 
7.  One may argue, correctly, that in many cases labor regulations end up redistributing 
in favor of the unionized or otherwise "protected" segment of the labor force, at the expense 
of other workers. 
8.  Nickell and Layard (1999); Nickell (1997). 
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Table  5. Comparing  the Minimum  Wage in the United States and the 
European  Union 
Percent 
Ratio  of minimum  wage to 
Average  manufacturing  wage 
Average  wagea  OECDb  Eurostatc 
Country  (1991-94)  (1997)  (1999) 
United  States  39  36  34 
European  Union  53  56  53 
France  50  68  63 
Germany  55  ...  ... 
Sweden  52  ...  ... 
United Kingdom  40  ...  44 
Source: Nickell and  Layard  (1999); OECD,  Employment  Outlook,  2000; authors'  calculations  based on data  from  Eurostat,  Min- 
imum  Wages  in the European  Union, 2001. 
a.  As reported  in Nickell and Layard  (1999). EU average  is for thirteen  countries  (excludes Greece and Luxembourg). 
b. EU average  is for Belgium, France,  Greece, Luxembourg,  the Netherlands,  Portugal,  and Spain. 
c.  EU average  is for Belgium, France,  Greece, Ireland,  Luxembourg,  the Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain,  and  the United Kingdom. 
the workplace  (see appendix  B). The minimum  score (representing  the 
least protection)  is zero and  the maximum  10. The second  column  reports 
an index of employment  protection  (that  is, restrictions  on the ability of 
enterprises  to terminate  employees),  with 20 indicating  the strictest  pro- 
tection. On the first measure  the United States has a score of zero, and 
on the second a score of one. The next three  columns  report  measures  of 
minimum  annual  leave and  the level and  duration  of unemployment  com- 
Table  6.  Labor Market Regulation  in the United States and the European  Union 
Units  as indicated 
Unemployment  benefit 
Labor  Employment  Minimum  Replacement 
standards,  protection,  annual  ratio,  Duration, 
1985-93a  1990b  leave, 1992  1989-94  1989-94 
Country  (index)  (index)  (weeks)  (percent)  (years) 
United  States  0  1  0  50  0.5 
European  Unionc  5  14  4  59  2.6 
France  6  14  5  57  3.0 
Germany  6  15  3  63  4.0 
Sweden  7  13  5  80  1.2 
United  Kingdom  0  7  0  38  4.0 
Source: Nickell and Layard  (1999); Nickell (1997). 
a.  Combines several measures  of labor  market  regulation  and ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 the maximum. 
b. Measures  the strength  of legal restrictions  on hiring and firing and ranges from 0 to 20, with 20 the maximum. 
c.  Simple average  of thirteen  EU countries (excludes Greece and Luxembourg). 
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pensation.  On all three  measures  the U.S. score  is below that  of the Euro- 
pean  Union as a whole and  below that  of any of the individual  European 
countries  listed (except that  the U.K. level of unemployment  compensa- 
tion is lower). 
Scores on these measures for a group of non-European,  non-U.S. 
OECD  countries  (Australia,  Canada,  Japan,  and  New Zealand;  data  not 
shown) lie somewhere  in between those of the United States and conti- 
nental Europe.  On some measures  these countries  may be closer to the 
United  States,  and  on others  closer  to Europe.  Overall,  however,  the  United 
States  and  Europe  appear  to be polar  extremes. 
Has It Worked? 
The consequences of the greater  expansion of the welfare state in 
Europe than in the United States are important,  but well beyond the 
already  broad  scope of this paper.  We want  to explain  the causes of this 
difference, not its consequences. Nevertheless, it is worth pausing to 
briefly  characterize  the conventional  wisdom  (if there  is any)  on this  issue. 
Needless to say, the question  of the impact  of a large  welfare  state  is dif- 
ficult  to answer  and  loaded  with  ideological  biases.  We  think  that  a fair  and 
relatively  uncontroversial  assessment  of the effect of these different  lev- 
els of redistributive  policies in the broadest  possible  terms  is as follows. 
As Vito  Tanzi  and  Ludger  Schuknecht  forcefully  argue  in a recent  study 
of the  growth  of government,  averages  of several  key social  indicators  such 
as health  measures,  life expectancy,  and  educational  achievement  are  not 
that  different  between  countries  with  a large  government  like those  in con- 
tinental  Europe  and countries with a small government  like that in the 
United States.9  On the other hand, a large body of research  has shown 
that  after-tax  income inequality  is lower in countries  with larger  govern- 
ments  and,  in particular,  in countries  with higher  social spending.10  As is 
well known,  comparing  inequality  and  poverty  rates  across  countries  is a 
minefield. However,  it is quite clear that after-tax  income inequality  is 
relatively  low in the  Nordic  countries,  intermediate  in central  and  southern 
Europe, higher in the United Kingdom, and higher still in the United 
States.  1I 
9.  Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000). 
10.  See, for instance, Atkinson (1995). 
11.  This picture emerges, for instance, from the detailed studies by Atkinson (1995). 
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When  one compares  the distribution  of disposable  income  across  pop- 
ulation  deciles in the United  States  and  Europe,  a striking  and  interesting 
difference  is the much  lower  proportion  of income accruing  to the lowest 
decile in the United States. That  is, the greater  inequality  in the United 
States  does not stem  from  the  top decile  being  particularly  wealthy  relative 
to the median,  so much  as from  the bottom  decile being  particularly  poor. 
For  instance,  in the 1  980s the average  income  among  the lowest  decile was 
about  a third  of the median  in the United  States,  compared  with  more  than 
55 percent  in many  European  countries,  including  France,  and  more  than 
60 percent  in several  Nordic  countries.12  Another  way of looking  at this is 
to compute  the fraction  of the population  with incomes  below 50 percent 
of the median.  (Many  European  countries  use this as a definition  of the 
poverty  line.) Depending  on the criteria  used, this fraction  was around  17 
to 18 percent  in the United  States  in the 1  980s, against  values  of 5 to 8 per- 
cent in Sweden  and  Germany."3 
In the 1990s income inequality  increased  sharply  in the United  King- 
dom and somewhat  less sharply  in the United States. In the continental 
European  countries,  changes  in income  inequality  in the last decade  were 
smaller.  It would appear  that,  because  of a smaller  emphasis  on policies 
that  redistribute  toward  the poor,  the bottom  decile of the income ladder 
in the United States is less well off than  the bottom  decile in European 
countries.  That  is, the U.S. poor  are  really  poor.  14 
How  much  the reduction  in inequality  achieved  by a more  redistributive 
government  "costs"  in terms  of slower  growth  because  of higher  taxation, 
more intrusive  regulation,  and so forth is a large and difficult question 
that we cannot  even begin to answer  here. Assar Lindbeck  provides an 
excellent and  exhaustive  discussion of this issue for Sweden.'5 His con- 
clusion is that in the long run the trade-off  between redistribution  and 
growth  is rather  steep. In 1970, before  the explosion of its welfare state, 
Sweden  had an income  per capita  equivalent  to 115 percent  of that  in the 
12.  Atkinson (1995, pp. 49-5 1). 
13.  Atkinson (1995, p. 90). 
14.  It should be clear, however, that this inverse relationship between  inequality  and 
the size of government is not monotonic. That is, certain countries are much more success- 
ful than others in reducing inequality for a given amount of social spending: the welfare state 
in different countries has had different degrees of success in reaching the truly needy. One 
problem is that, in certain countries (Italy being a perfect example),  welfare  spending is 
too biased in favor of pensions. See Boeri (2000). 
15.  Lindbeck (1997). 
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average  OECD country-the  fourth-highest  of all. By 1995, however, 
Sweden's income per capita  was only 95 percent  of the OECD  average, 
and Sweden  had fallen to sixteenth  place. One may wonder  whether  the 
trade-off  is so steep at levels of social protection  less extreme  than  Swe- 
den's. Other countries with extended welfare states have not done as 
poorly  as Sweden.  Also, certain  aspects  of redistributive  policies, such as 
a well-functioning public education system, may foster human  capital 
accumulation.  A related  issue is the  cost in terms  of employment  formation 
and growth of labor protection,  but this is another  immense topic that 
would  require  not one but  several  papers  to do it justice. 
Charity and the Private Provision of Welfare 
The preceding  evidence makes it clear that European  countries  pro- 
vide more  public welfare  than  the United  States.  But Americans  engage 
in more  private  provision  of welfare  (that  is, charity)  than  do Europeans. 
As private  citizens,  Americans  appear  to give more  of their  time and  their 
money  to the poor  than  do Europeans. 
We  use the  World  Values  Survey  to calculate  the share  of adults  in each 
of several  European  countries  who are members  of charitable  organiza- 
tions.  The World  Values  Survey  is a collection  of surveys  where  the same 
questions  are  asked  in different  countries  in different  years.  Between  600 
and 2,000 people are interviewed  in each country;  appendix  B provides 
details  on the countries  and  survey  years.  Although  membership  in chari- 
table organizations  is an imperfect  measure  of the time contribution  to 
charity  (it does not measure  the intensity  of involvement),  it is one of the 
best measures  available.  In the United  States, 11 percent  of respondents 
say that  they  participated  in a charitable  group  over  the last year;  the aver- 
age for the European  countries  in the survey  is 4 percent.  The European 
country  with the highest  proportion  of membership  in private  charities  is 
the  Netherlands,  with  almost  9 percent  of respondents  saying  that  they  par- 
ticipate.  At the other  end of the spectrum  is Denmark,  where  2 percent  of 
individuals  claim  to have  participated  in these activities. 
This work corroborates  the large literature  on private  charity  in the 
United  States.  For  example,  the  U.K. National  Council  for  Volunteer  Orga- 
nizations  and the not-for-profit  group  United for a Fair  Economy  docu- 
ment  that  charitable  contributions  in the  United  States  totaled  $190 billion 
in 2000, or $691 a person.  This compares  with reported  contributions  per 
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capita of $141 in the United Kingdom and $57 for Europe  as a whole. 
Notably,  a large  fraction  of American  donors  make  charitable  contributions 
even though  they take  only the standard  deduction  on their  income  taxes. 
This means  that,  for many  Americans,  contributions  are  not being driven 
by the tax deductibility  of charitable  donations.  Theda  Skocpol,  Marshall 
Ganz,  and  Ziad  Munson  document  the  national  coverage  of the many  U.S. 
volunteer  groups  who provide  a rich  variety  of forms  of assistance.'6 
These results  suggest,  but  hardly  prove,  two implications.  First,  public 
provision of welfare in part crowds out private charity.  As argued  by 
Glaeser  and  Andrei  Shleifer,  if government  transfers  to particular  individ- 
uals fall as private  donations  rise, these transfers  will reduce  the incentive 
for private  charity.  '7 These  results  also suggest  that  Europe's  more  gener- 
ous provision  of welfare  does  not stem  from  a greater  innate  endowment  of 
altruism  in Europe. 
Theory and Discussion 
In this section  we present  a brief formal  model on the determinants  of 
the level of redistribution.'8  We model the welfare system as a schedule 
of transfers  that  is indexed  with  a single  parameter:  the tax  rate  on income 
t.  In this system  each individual  receives  net transfers  equal  to (8Y-  Y), 
where  Y  is the individual's  income,  Y  is average  income  in the country,  and 
6 < 1 represents  the waste involved  in redistribution.  This welfare  system 
is self-financing,  in the sense that  the average  payment  in the country  is 
equal  to zero.  The parameter  6 is meant  to capture  a wide range  of possi- 
ble inefficiencies  related  to government,  such as administrative  costs and 
politically  motivated  spending  on programs  with little social value.  It can 
also capture  the welfare  losses due to tax distortions;  in this case 6 should 
be a function  of t,  to capture  the fact that  social welfare  losses generally 
rise proportionately  to the square  of the tax rate, but for simplicity we 
assume  that  6 and  t  are  independent. 
16.  Skocpol,  Ganz, and Munson  (2000).  Although  Putnam (2000)  argues that civic 
voluntarism has declined in the United States, we do not address this decline here. Rather 
we focus on the differences over space, not over time. 
17.  Glaeser and Shleifer (2001b). 
18.  The logic of this model is closely  tied to the work of Benabou and Ok (2001),  Per- 
otti (2000),  Picketty (1995),  and many others, and this work should be seen as a synthesis, 
not as a new model. 
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The timing of the model is such that, in the first period, individuals 
receive  income  equal  to YO  and  choose t  for the second  period.  The first- 
period  tax rate was already  fixed, and we do not model consumption  or 
saving  during  this period.  First-period  income serves  just as a signal for 
second-period  income, and  its distribution  is captured  by a density  func- 
tion g(*). 
In the second  period,  incomes  are  revealed  and  redistribution  and  con- 
sumption  occur.  Income  in the second  period,  Y(YO,&),  equals (1 - O)YO  + 
0 [ji(YO)  + eJ.  The parameter  0 captures  the extent  of income mobility:  a 
low value  of 0 means  that  income  in the second  period  will be almost  equal 
to income in the first period. The variable ji(YO)  is the mean of the 
second-period  income shock, which is a weakly increasing  function  of 
prior  income.  This function  will also capture  the extent  of income  mobil- 
ity. For  example,  if ji(YO)  = YO,  then  incomes  will be much  more  fixed  than 
if ii(YO)  is constant  across  individuals.  The term  E represents  a mean  zero 
disturbance  term  that  is assumed  to be orthogonal  to the other  terms  and 
distributed  with density  fQ  ). 
Individuals consume all of their second-period income (net of re- 
distribution)  and receive utility from personal consumption equal to 
U((1  -  T)(I-  O)YO  +  +[R(YO)  + t6aY}). Thus, expected utility (as of the 
first  period)  from second-period  personal  consumption  equals 
(1)  f  U((I-  t){(1 -  0)YO  + O[RI(YO)  + Fj}  + t6Y)f  ()dc. 
E 
We assume  that  people care about  the consumption  of others  as well as 
their  own. For tractability  we measure  altruism  as follows: each person 
puts a weight a(YO)  on the utility  he or she derives  from  the private  con- 
sumption  utilities  of other  people;  this  term  reflects  interpersonal  altruism, 
and we assume that oc(YO)  ? 0. Total  expected utility from private  con- 
sumption  and  interpersonal  utility  equals 
JU  ((1 -t){(1  - 0)Yo  + 0[jI(Yo)  + 6]J+ t6Y)f  (F)d  + 
J  X(YO  )f  U((1  -  t){(1 -  0)YO  + 0[RI(YO)  + E]}+ 6Y) f (F)g(Yo  )d?dYo. 
Yo  e 
We represent  the political  process as the social choice problem  of maxi- 
mizing a weighted sum of all people's expected utilities. The political 
This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Sat, 7 Jun 2014 14:37:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsAlberto  Alesina, Edward  Glaeser,  and Bruce Sacerdote  205 
arrangement  is captured  by the weights that different  people get in the 
political process. In particular,  each person  receives a weight of X(Y0)  in 
the social choice problem,  where X(Y0)  2 0. This weight is a function  of 
their initial endowment.  For example, under  a system of majority  rule 
when preferences  for redistribution  (the level of t)  have a single peak, 
the social choice problem  will assign  weight  only to the tastes  of the indi- 
vidual with median  income. In the proposition  we will assume  X(Y0)  = 1 
+ X(Y- Y0)  , which gives us a single parameter,  X, that reflects the extent to 
which  the preferences  of the poor  are  internalized  by the  political  process. 
Thus  the total social welfare  function  becomes 
Jf[x(Yo) +  X(YO)] x 
J  U(QI  -  ){(1 - O)Y0  + O[g(Y0)  + Fj}  + 6Y)f  (F)g(Yo  )ddYoY, 
E 
and the optimal amount of redistribution  will satisfy the first-order 
condition 
J [x(YO)  +  X(YO)] x 
(4)  f  8  [6Y -  Y(Yo,' )]U [(1 -  T)Y(Yo,  6) + t6Y]f (?)g(Yo)d&1Yo  = 0. 
E 
The following  proposition  captures  the role of altruism  or political  power: 
Proposition  1: If X(Y0)  = 1 + X(Y  -  Y0), and x(YO)  = ao  +  a(Y  -  Yo), and 
the level of t  that  maximizes  social welfare  is between  0 and 1, then the 
level of redistribution  is rising  in both  a and  X. 
This proposition  is unsurprising,  but it highlights  the two factors  that 
will probably  be most  important  in driving  geographic  differences  in redis- 
tribution.  First, factors  that  reduce  altruism  toward  the poor will reduce 
redistribution.  Second, factors that increase the political power of the 
poor  will increase  redistribution. 
This proposition  suggests two broad  explanations  for why redistribu- 
tion might differ between the United States and Europe.  First, it might 
be that differing political structures  lead the level of X to be higher in 
Europe;  that is, the poor have more political representation  there. One 
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such difference is the proportional  representation  that  exists in several 
European  countries, which may make it easier for parties focusing on 
the poorest  citizens to survive.  Another  is that  the U.S. Constitution  puts 
considerable  brakes  on democracy  in ways that  European  institutions  do 
not. Certain  U.S. institutions  that  are  not democratic  have  veto rights  over 
redistribution  in some contexts. For example, the U.S. Supreme  Court 
ruled  the income  tax to be illegal in the 1  890s, despite  its earlier  use dur- 
ing the Civil War. 
The second  broad  explanation  is that x might  be different  in the United 
States  and  Europe.  This could  be true  for several  reasons.  Most  obviously, 
if altruism  between races is limited,'9  we might expect that  the greater 
racial  heterogeneity  in the  United  States  would  lead  to a lower  desire  of the 
median  voter,  who is white,  to give to poor  persons  of another  color.  More 
subtly,  it may be that  Americans  are  more  likely to associate  poverty  with 
laziness  and  to consider  the  poor  unworthy  of assistance.  We discuss  these 
issues later. 
We  now turn  to the economic  model  of selfish  redistribution  and  major- 
ity rule.  This model assumes  that  there  is no altruism  and  that  the level of 
redistribution  is determined  by the preferences  of the median voter. In 
this extreme  model  the optimization  problem  becomes 
(5)  f  U((1  ){(1  -  )YMed  +  O[!I(YMed)  +  F1]J+  t6)Y)f (F)ds, 
E 
where  YMed is the income  of the median  voter,  and  this  yields the derivative 
(6)  (6  {(1  -  O)YMed  +  0[!I(YMed)  +  ?R]J  U  [Y(F)]f (F)d. 
E 
Inspection  of equation  6 yields the following  result,  which  is well known 
in the literature: 
Proposition  2: When  0 = 0, the median  voter  will redistribute  if and  only 
if 6 > YMedIY,  and  the median  voter will demand  complete  redistribution 
when that  condition  holds. 
19.  As in Becker (1957). 
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Thus,  when  there  is no income  uncertainty  and  no altruism,  the median 
voter goes to a corner solution.20  The absence of income uncertainty 
(0 = 0) can also be interpreted  as suggesting  a static  model where  income 
is known  at the time that  redistribution  is chosen. 
In general, two things determine  whether  the median  voter demands 
redistribution.  First, if the social welfare losses inherent  in taxation  are 
quite high (that is, 6 is low), redistribution  is unlikely. Second, if the 
income distribution  is quite skewed, YMed  will be low relative to Y, and 
redistribution  is more  likely. 
When there is income uncertainty,  and when levels of redistribution 
are set before  income  levels are  revealed,  we are  much  more  likely to find 
an interior solution for the level of redistribution.  To concentrate  on 
income  dynamics,  we persist  in examining  the  median  voter  model  with  no 
altruism.  In this  case equation  6 will be set to zero  when  there  is an  interior 
solution,  and  differentiating  this first-order  condition  provides  the follow- 
ing comparative  statics: 
Proposition 3: 
(a) If the  coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion  is less than  one, the level of 
redistribution will fall with !I(YMed) and rise with 6. 
(b) If the variance  of E is small, and expected income growth  for the 
median  voter  is strictly  positive,  redistribution  will fall with 0. 
(c) If ,u(YMed) =  61 and expected income growth  is weakly negative, 
redistribution  will rise with 0. 
Proposition  3a tells us that  redistribution  will fall as the median  voter's 
expected  income  in the second  period  rises (holding  average  income  con- 
stant).  The comparative  static analysis for 6 tells us that redistribution 
declines when it creates more deadweight  loss. Proposition  3b tells us 
that when income shocks have a positive mean for the median voter, 
greater  income  mobility  leads  to a decreased  desire  for  redistribution.  This 
20.  In this formulation, optimization gives us a corner solution because waste is inde- 
pendent of the tax rate. In the more general model,  the median voter chooses  an interior 
solution for the tax rate that sets the marginal benefits from an additional dollar of welfare 
spending equal to the marginal social  loss  from waste.  Proposition  2 is a special  case of 
Meltzer and Richard (1981).  Alesina  and Rodrik (1994)  and Persson and Tabellini (1994) 
develop this redistribution model in a growth context. 
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result  is closest to the work  of Ronald  Benabou  and  Efe Ok,2'  who show 
that  expected  income growth  for the median  voter  limits the demand  for 
redistribution. 
Proposition  3c tells us that  the impact  of income  mobility  will increase 
the demand  for redistribution  if income shocks have a negative mean. 
When  income shocks  have a zero mean,  risk aversion  means  that  greater 
income mobility leads to more demand  for redistribution.  One can also 
interpret  this  result  as a variant  on John  Rawls,22  who argued  that  risk  aver- 
sion provides a justification for welfare policies. If there is no hetero- 
geneity of first-period  income, so that  all people have the same tastes, a 
greater  value  of 0 implies  a greater  variance  of second-period  income.  This 
interpretation  suggests  that  countries  with  high  before-tax  income  inequal- 
ity will have  more  redistribution. 
Overall,  the relationship  between  income  mobility  and  redistribution  is 
complicated.  More  mobility  leads to less redistribution  if, as in the case 
of Benabou  and Ok, expected  income shocks move the median  voter  up 
the income  distribution.  However,  if expected  income shocks  have a zero 
mean,  risk  aversion  means  that  more  mobility  leads  to greater  demand  for 
redistribution. 
Empirical Evidence 
For purposes  of testing the above propositions,  we sort the possible 
explanations  of the extent of redistribution  into three  groups,  which we 
label  (somewhat imprecisely) economic,  political,  and behavioral 
explanations. 
Economic Explanations 
BEFORE-TAX  INCOME INEQUALITY.  Propositions  2 and 3 suggest that 
redistribution  will be higher  in Europe  if before-tax  income inequality  is 
higher there, or if the income distribution  is more likely to be highly 
skewed.  We noted above  that  after-tax  income inequality  is higher  in the 
United  States.  Nevertheless,  it is possible  that  government  intervention  in 
21.  Benabou and Ok (2001). 
22.  Rawls (1971). 
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Europe  is so widespread  that it reverses a basic, underlying  pattern  of 
higher  before-tax  inequality. 
The standard  source on before-tax  income inequality  is the database 
compiled  by Klaus  Deininger  and  Lyn  Squire.23  The before-tax  Gini coef- 
ficient for the United States is 38.5, whereas  the average  for European 
countries  is 29.1, which means  that  Europe  appears  to have significantly 
less before-tax inequality.  The United Kingdom has the most income 
inequality  in the European  sample,  but  its Gini  coefficient  is still only 32.3. 
To examine  skewness,  we can look at the share  of income earned  by the 
top quintile. In the United States the top 20 percent of income earners 
take  home  43.5 percent  of the  before-tax  dollars.  In Europe  on average,  the 
top quintile  earns  37.1 percent  of before-tax  income, and  in no European 
country  does the top quintile  earn  more  than  41 percent.  It seems  clear  that 
the United  States  has more  before-tax  inequality  than  Europe  and  a more 
skewed  income  distribution.  Although  these  numbers  are  before  tax,  redis- 
tribution  may nonetheless  have  taken  place in many  ways before  earnings 
occur at all (through  education,  for example). Indeed,  lower before-tax 
income  inequality  may be yet another  example  of the effects of European 
redistribution.  More  generally,  the evidence  on whether  inequality  creates 
more  redistribution  is mixed  at best.  Roberto  Perotti  finds  little support  for 
this channel  in a broad  empirical  investigation.24 
There  are  two possible explanations  for the apparent  failure  of before- 
tax inequality,  as measured  by the Gini coefficient,  to lead to more  redis- 
tribution.  First,  in countries  with greater  income inequality,  the poor are 
unlikely  to have  much  political  clout and  hence  may not be able  to extract 
much  redistribution  from  the rich.  That  is, such  countries  may lack a one- 
person,  one-vote  rule,  which  underlies  the  model's  results,  but  instead  have 
something  closer to a one-dollar,  one-vote rule. We devote much space 
below to a discussion  of the political determinants  of redistribution,  and 
the political power of the poor is a critical  factor.  Second, the measured 
before-tax  Gini coefficient is a poor indicator  of before-tax  inequality, 
because a host of other policies (in addition to the tax system) affect 
inequality,  so that  the  Gini  coefficient  may  overestimate  the  true  before-tax 
inequality  in the United  States.  However,  the direct  evidence  on the mini- 
mum  wage,  discussed  above,  and  on executive  compensation  suggests  that 
this interpretation  is not likely to hold. 
23.  See Deininger and Squire (1996). 
24.  Perotti (1996).  Benabou (1996)  also surveys the evidence  and comes  to a similar 
conclusion. 
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THE COSTS  OF REDISTRIBUTION.  Proposition  2 also suggests  that  there 
might  be more  redistribution  in Europe  if taxation  creates  fewer  distortions 
there,  or if spending  on redistribution  in Europe  is less likely to be asso- 
ciated  with administrative  costs or wasteful  pet projects.  For  example,  if 
Europeans  have access to less distortionary  forms  of taxation,  we would 
expect  Europeans  to have  bigger  welfare  states. 
Although  we suspect  that  improvements  in the technology  of taxation 
have  played  a major  role in increasing  redistribution  over  time, we do not 
believe that  European  taxation  is much  more  efficient  than  American  tax- 
ation.25  Indeed,  evidence on tax evasion suggests the contrary.  Tax  eva- 
sion does not itself capture  inefficiency, but it does suggest limits to 
efficient  tax collection.  The ability  of citizens to avoid  taxes is a primary 
limit on the menu  of forms  of taxation  that  the state  can use. 
The 1996 Global Competitiveness Report surveyed business leaders 
about  tax compliance  in their  countries.  On this subjective  measure  the 
United  States  received  a score  of 4.47 (where  6 represents  maximal  com- 
pliance).  Although  there  is considerable  heterogeneity  across  Europe,  on 
average  tax compliance  appears  to be much  lower  there:  the average  score 
was 3.5. Furthermore,  there  is no evidence  that  Europeans  impose  less dis- 
tortionary  taxes.  As discussed  above,  the tax structure  in Europe  is quite 
varied. Europe  is the home of the value added  tax, a consumption  tax, 
which is thought  to be less distortionary  than a pure  income tax. How- 
ever, Europe  also uses rent controls and certain  labor market  interven- 
tions  that  appear  to be much  more  distortionary.26 
Although redistribution  in the United States is probably not more 
wasteful  than  redistribution  in Europe,  it certainly  seems plausible  that 
Americans  are  inherently  more  hostile  to government,  and  more  prone  to 
believe  that  governments  are  wasteful  and  likely to spend  on projects  that 
the voters oppose. Indeed, the United States was created  from an anti- 
government  revolution, and its history includes a civil war in which 
roughly  half the country  fought against  the federal government.  Forty- 
eight percent  of European  respondents  to the World  Values  Survey  favor 
25.  The strongest piece of evidence suggesting massive improvement in tax collection 
technology is the use of income taxes rather  than much simpler taxes such as import fees and 
property taxes. It may well  be true that differences  in redistribution between  the OECD 
and the developing world are a result of differences in access to less distortionary forms of 
taxation. 
26.  See, for example, Blanchard and Portugal (2001). 
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greater  government  ownership  in the  economy,  whereas  only 26 percent  of 
Americans  express  that  opinion.  This  probably  reflects  a greater  distrust  of 
the state  within  the United  States. 
However,  another  piece of evidence makes it unlikely that  American 
anti-statism  alone explains the low level of redistribution  in the United 
States  and  further  casts doubt  on the view that  Europe  has access to less 
distortionary  taxes. If the real or perceived costs of government  were 
higher  in the United States, we would expect European  governments  to 
be bigger  along every  dimension,  since, after  all, they face a lower social 
cost of funds.  As we discussed  above,  this is not the case. 
SOCIAL  MOBILITY  AND  INCOME  UNCERTAINTY.  The economic model 
presented  above suggests that  there  are two ways in which social mobil- 
ity can  explain  the gap  between  U.S. and  European  levels of welfare.  First, 
the median  voter  in the United  States  might  expect higher  future  income 
growth  (relative  to other  Americans)  than  does the  median  voter  in Europe. 
According to this theory, high income mobility in the United States 
(specifically, upward  mobility of the median voter) can explain lower 
U.S. redistribution.  Second, Europeans  might demand  more redistribu- 
tion because  they face more  exogenous  shocks  to their  incomes (perhaps 
because of the greater  openness of their  economies), and redistribution 
reduces  risk.  According  to this theory,  low income  mobility  in the United 
States  could  explain  lower  U.S. redistribution. 
As we will discuss  later,  a third-behavioral-theory also links  income 
mobility with redistribution.  This theory  suggests that,  in societies with 
high income  mobility,  the nonpoor  are  more  likely to believe that  poverty 
is due  to laziness.  In more  static  societies,  where  birth  determines  income, 
the nonpoor  are  more  likely to think  that  the disadvantaged  are  poor  solely 
because of the accident  of their  birth.  We will discuss this theory  in the 
section  on the determinants  of altruism,  and  for now note simply  that  this 
theory  offers  an alternative  interpretation  of why higher  American  mobil- 
ity might  be associated  with less redistribution. 
Alesina and  Eliana  La Ferrara  provide  evidence  on the first  economic 
theory  linking  economic  mobility  with support  for redistribution.27  They 
find  that  individuals  with greater  expected  income  growth  are  more  likely 
to oppose  redistribution.  Using U.S. data,  these  authors  compute  the prob- 
ability that individuals  in different  income brackets  will reach  levels of 
27. Alesina  and  La Ferrara  (2001). 
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income in the future  that  will make them  net losers from  redistribution. 
This  probability  of upward  mobility  is a strong  predictor  of individual  sup- 
port  for redistribution. 
For this theory to explain differences in redistribution  between the 
United  States  and  Europe,  it must  be the case that  the median  voter  in the 
United States is more likely than  the median  European  voter to become 
rich at some future  date.  This probability  combines  higher  mobility  with 
the specific  chance  of moving  upward  for individuals  in the middle  of the 
income distribution.  There are two types of evidence on this question: 
actual  income  mobility  data  and  survey  questions  about  income  mobility. 
Survey  questions  seem to have the advantage  of getting directly  at indi- 
vidual  beliefs, which should  be the direct  determinant  of voting  behavior. 
Differences  in income  mobility  across  countries  turn  out to be quite  con- 
troversial,28  and  measurement  here is difficult  because  of the high degree 
of idiosyncratic  measurement  error  present  in all survey  measures  of indi- 
vidual  income. 
It is clear that  Americans  believe they live in a country  with greater 
income mobility.  According to the World  Values Survey,  71 percent  of 
Americans,  but  only 40 percent  of Europeans,  believe that  the poor  have 
a chance to escape from poverty.  But although  these survey questions 
suggest  very  different  beliefs about  mobility,  they  do not directly  relate  to 
the  relative  income  growth  prospects  of the  median  voter.  Indeed,  the  ques- 
tion seems to relate more to feelings about the poor and the altruistic 
sources  of redistribution  than  to the financial  gains from  redistribution  to 
the median  voter. 
Harder  data  on income  mobility  do not suggest  such strong  differences 
in mobility  for the middle  classes between  the United  States  and  Europe. 
For example,  Peter  Gottschalk  and  Enrico Spolaore  construct  a fifteen- 
year transition matrix by income quintile for the United States and 
Europe.29  This matrix  shows the shares  of the middle  income quintile  in 
1984 who were in various income quintiles in 1999. The similarity 
observed  between  the United  States  and  Germany  is striking,  even  though 
there  seems to be a slightly  higher  upward  mobility  of the middle  class in 
the United  States.  Ten  percent  of Germans,  and 11 percent  of Americans, 
in the middle  quintile  moved  to the top quintile  over the period.  Twenty- 
28.  Fields and Ok (1999) provide a survey. 
29.  Gottschalk and Spolaore (2001). 
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one percent  of Germans,  and  23 percent  of Americans,  in the middle  quin- 
tile moved  up to the second  quintile.  An almost  identical  share  (31 percent) 
of both groups stayed in the middle quintile. Middle-quintile  Germans 
were somewhat  more likely to end up in the bottom  quintile  (16 percent 
versus 12 percent  of Americans)  and were correspondingly  less likely to 
end up in the next lowest quintile,  but  overall  the differences  seem small. 
Daniele Checchi, Andrea Ichino, and Andrea Rustichini suggest that 
mobility  is higher  in the United  States  than  in Italy.30 
The survey  by Gary  Fields and  Ok suggests  a wide range  of estimates 
on income mobility and the comparison  between the United States and 
Europe.  However,  there  is no clear-cut  evidence that  the middle  quintile 
in the United  States  has substantially  more  upward  relative  mobility  than 
its German  counterpart.  The bottom line of the evidence presented  by 
Alesina and  La Ferrara  is that  upward  mobility is important.  Americans 
believe  that  there  is more  upward  mobility  in their  country.  These  two facts 
together  can  explain  an aversion  to redistribution.  The  question  of whether 
this perception  of greater  mobility  in the United  States  is correct  or mis- 
taken  awaits  further  research. 
The second  theory-that income  variability  drives  demand  for redistri- 
bution-has received  less extensive  testing.  An exception  is work  by Dani 
Rodrik,  which focuses on the variability  of income induced  by openness, 
an argument  to which  we now turn. 
Rodrik,  following  a suggestion  by David  Cameron,  has argued  that  the 
size of government  and,  especially,  of income  support  policies is explained 
by the openness of the economy.3'  Figure  2 highlights  this relationship. 
According  to Rodrik,  open economies are more  "unstable"  because  they 
are  more  subject  to external  shocks.  Larger  public  transfers  provide  insur- 
ance and  reduce  instability  in the stream  of lifetime income of individu- 
als. Thus,  more  open  economies  "need"  a larger  government.  Alesina  and 
Romain  Wacziarg  argue  that  open economies are small, that  is, that  size 
and  openness  are  strongly  inversely  correlated.32  Because  small  economies 
tend  to be more  open, it is difficult  to disentangle  the openness  argument 
from  an alternative  one, namely,  that  in larger  economies  the size of gov- 
ernment  per  capita,  or as a share  of GDP,  is smaller  because  of economies 
30.  Checchi, Ichino, and Rustichini (1999), 
31.  Rodrik (1998); Cameron (1978). 
32.  Alesina and Wacziarg (1998). 
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Figure  2. Relationship  between  Transfers  and Openness  in OECD Countries 
Transfers  (percent  of GDP) 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  based on data  for 1960-98 from the IMF and Persson  and  Tabellini  (2000). 
a.  Sum of exports  and imports,  as a share  of GDP. 
of scale in the production  of public  goods.33  However,  the openness  argu- 
ment  should  apply  more  directly  to transfer  programs,  and  the economies- 
of-scale idea  more  to public  goods and  infrastructure.  Since in the present 
paper  we are  concerned  with  transfers  and  welfare  programs,  the openness 
argument  is, in principle,  especially  appealing. 
The  United  States  is a larger  and  less open  economy  than  any  in Europe, 
but  as table  7 shows,  it is also less stable  than  the average  European  econ- 
omy.  In terms  of growth,  unemployment,  and  productivity,  the U.S. econ- 
omy has displayed more volatility than the average of the European 
countries  over the last forty years. The table also reports  Rodrik's  mea- 
sure  of externally  induced  volatility,  which  multiplies  an  economy's  terms- 
of-trade  volatility by its degree of openness (measured  as exports  plus 
imports,  divided  by GDP).  This can be interpreted  in two ways. First,  the 
U.S. economy may have more  variability  precisely  because  transfers  are 
smaller.  However,  since  the  U.S. economy  is more  closed, it should  be less 
33.  See Alesina and Spolaore (1997)  for further discussion. 
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Table 7. Standard Deviations  of Selected Economic  Indicators  in the United States 
and the European  Union, 1960-2000 
Series  Period  United  States  European  Union 
GDP growth  1960-97  0.020  0.017 
Labor productivity in manufacturing  1980-96  0.026  0.016 
Unemployment ratea  1970-2000  0.414  0.220 
Competitivenessb  1975-99  0.057  0.046 
Terms of tradec  1971-90  0.086  0.088 
Externally induced volatilityd  1971-90  1.650  7.010 
Source: Authors'  calculations based on data from OECD, OECD Statistical Compendium,  1999; and Rodrik  (1998). 
a.  Standard  deviation divided by the mean. 
b.  Index of relative export price of manufactured  goods. EU average is for France, Germany,  Italy, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom. 
c.  From Rodrik (1998).  This measure reports the standard deviation of the differences in terms of trade (expressed as 
logarithms). 
d.  Terms-of-trade  volatility times the sum of exports and imports  as a share  of GDP. 
in need of a larger  government.  In other  words,  if all countries  shared  the 
same objectives in terms of the trade-off  between government  size and 
business  cycle variability,  the United  States  should  be more,  not less, sta- 
ble than Europe.34  Since it is larger and more closed to begin with, it 
should cost less in terms  of taxation  to achieve the same level of stabi- 
lization.35  Therefore,  if Rodrik's  theory  is correct,  the fact that  the United 
States  has  experienced  greater  variability  than  Europe  suggests  that  Amer- 
icans and  Europeans  evaluate  very differently  the trade-off  between  gov- 
ernment  size and  cyclical variability.  Whether  or not openness  is a major 
determinant  of the size of government  remains,  in any case, an unsettled 
issue. 
Political Explanations 
Our  examination  of the possible political  explanations  of U.S.-Europe 
differences  begins  with several  cross-country  regressions  relating  selected 
features  of countries'  electoral  systems  to the extent  of redistribution;  we 
then  discuss  the role of political  history. 
34.  Similar considerations  apply to Japan, a country that has a small government,  is 
relatively  closed  (and large),  and exhibits  more income  variability  than the European 
countries. 
35.  An additional  measure  of income  uncertainty  could  be the extent  of long-term 
unemployment. However, this measure is very likely to be directly affected by labor mar- 
ket regulation and policies. 
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CROSS-COUNTRY  REGRESSIONS:  THE  ELECTORAL  SYSTEM.  A  lively 
recent literature  has investigated  theoretically  and empirically  the rela- 
tionship  between  electoral  rules  and  fiscal  policy.36  Particularly  relevant  for 
our purposes  is recent work by Gian Milesi-Ferretti,  Perotti, and Mas- 
simo Rostagno (MFPR) and by Torsten  Persson and Guido Tabellini 
(PT).37  These  papers  test the  hypothesis  that,  in majoritarian  systems  char- 
acterized  by geographically  based  districts  in which  each district  chooses 
one representative,  the elected government  will favor  spending  programs 
that  can  be geographically  targeted.  Proportional  electoral  systems,  in con- 
trast,  will favor  spending  on universal  programs,  according  to this  hypoth- 
esis, since in each district more than one representative  is elected in 
proportion  to the vote received.  The clearest  example  of this is a purely 
proportional  election in a single national  district.  In this case geographic 
targeting  would  make  no sense at all. 
To test these ideas, one needs to measure  the degree  of proportionality 
of electoral  systems  and  to differentiate  between  spending  programs  that 
can  be geographically  targeted  and  those  that  cannot.  In theory  the contrast 
between  these two types of programs  is clear-cut;  in practice,  less so. For 
instance,  anyone  above  a certain  age is eligible to receive social security 
payments,  regardless  of residence.  However,  certain  districts  may be dis- 
proportionately  populated  by elderly  voters.  In any event,  the hypothesis 
tested  is that  universal  transfer  programs  should  be larger  in countries  with 
more  proportional  electoral  systems. 
Both MFPR  and  PT report  results  consistent  with this hypothesis.  The 
two papers  use different  measures  of transfers,  a different  sample  of coun- 
tries (that  of PT is larger),  and a different  definition  of proportionality. 
Appendix  B explains  these differences  in the data  sets more  precisely,  but 
one important  observation concerning the dependent variable is that 
MFPR  use OECD  data  as a source  for OECD  countries  and  a data  set con- 
structed  by Michael  Gavin  and  Perotti  for Latin  America.38  All these data 
refer  to the general  government.  PT,  in contrast,  use International  Mone- 
tary  Fund  data,  which are focused on the central  government.  This dis- 
tinction  is especially  important  if one is comparing  the United  States  with 
other  countries:  the United  States  is a federal  system  in which the differ- 
36.  Persson and Tabellini (2000) provide an exhaustive review of this area of research. 
37.  Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (forthcoming); Persson and Tabellini (2000). 
See also Persson (2001). 
38.  Gavin and Perotti (1997). 
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ence between  central  and  general  government  data  is much  larger  than  in 
most other countries. To measure proportionality,  PT use a variable, 
obtained  from  "Interparliamentary  Union,"  that  assumes  the value of one 
if a country  has a majoritarian  system  and  zero  otherwise.  Obviously,  elec- 
toral  systems  differ  on many  dimensions,  and  a zero-one  dummy  may  miss 
important  differences  between  the two groups  of systems  lumped  together. 
For  this reason,  MFPR  construct  (for a smaller  sample  of countries)  a 
continuous  variable  based on the following idea. They want to capture 
the share  of electoral  votes that  guarantees  a party  a parliamentary  seat in 
an  electoral  district  of average  size. This  variable,  labeled  UMS  (for  "upper 
marginal  share"),  is declining  in proportionality,  since the higher  is UMS, 
the more  difficult  it is for small parties  to gain access to parliament.  In a 
two-party  system  with a first-past-the-post  rule, UMS  takes  a value  of 0.5. 
This value declines with the degree  of proportionality  of the system.  As 
these  authors  show,  constructing  this  variable  is not a simple  task,  because 
of  the many dimensions on which electoral systems differ across 
countries.39 
Table 8 presents results we obtained  using the data sets kindly pro- 
vided by the authors  of these two papers.  Column  8-1 reports  the MFPR 
regression  on OECD  countries.  The  proportionality  variable  is constructed 
as an "average  district  size,"  and  it is a one-to-one  inverse  transformation 
of UMS.40  Thus  one should  expect  a positive  sign on this variable  if trans- 
fers are  larger  in more  proportional  systems.  And in fact this variable  (in 
logarithms)  has a highly  significant  positive  coefficient.  The  other  controls 
used by MFPR  are  insignificant. 
39. There  is an additional  channel  through  which  the  electoral  system  may  influence  fis- 
cal policy, namely,  the degree of fragmentation  of the legislature.  Since in proportional 
systems  it is easier  for small  parties  to gain representation,  proportionality  leads to multi- 
party  coalition  governments  and  a fragmented  policy  arena.  Theoretical  work  by  Alesina  and 
Drazen  (1991) and  Tornell  and  Velasco  (1995), among  others,  shows  how fragmentation  of 
the political  system  leads  to larger  and  more  persistent  deficits.  Empirical  work  by Roubini 
and Sachs (1989a, 1989b) and Kontopoulos  and Perotti  (1999), among  others,  provides 
support  for  this  hypothesis  with  regard  to OECD  countries.  In  these  papers,  fragmentation  is 
measured  as a function  of the number  of parties  represented  in the government  coalition  or 
in the legislature,  or by the number  of different  ministers  in the government  with authority 
over spending.  Interestingly,  Milesi-Ferretti,  Perotti,  and Rostagno  (forthcoming)  show 
that  the degree  of proportionality  of the electoral  system  affects  transfers  even when  mea- 
sures  of fragmentation  are  controlled  for. 
40.  The transformed  variable  is called the standard  magnitude  (SM), where SM = 
1/(1 -  UMS). 
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Table  8.  Cross-Country  Regressions  Explaining  Transfers  with Political  Variablesa 
Independent  variable  8-1  8-2  8-3  8-4 
Proportionalityb  2.150**  1.809*  1.021* 
(0.656)  (0.728)  (0.421) 
GDP  per  capita  5.151  5.035  1.823  -0.876 
(3.571)  (3.558)  (1.519)  (0.980) 
Opennessc  0.043  0.032  0.009 
(0.040)  (0.027)  (0.010) 
Percent  of population  over  65  0.753  0.678  1.096**  1.315** 
(0.478)  (0.481)  (0.298)  (0.217) 
Percent  of population  aged 15-64  0.140 
(0.138) 
Majoritarian  regime  dummyd  -1.526 
(0.994) 
Presidential  regime  dummy  -0.207 
(1.227) 
Asia dummy  2.047 
(2.691) 
Caribbean  dummy  -0.095 
(2.164) 
Latin  America  dummy  -0.791  1.042 
(3.102)  (1.776) 
Summary  statistic 
No. of observations  20  20  38  60 
R  2  0.58  0.61  0.84  0.82 
Source: Authors' calculations using data from Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (forthcoming); Persson and Tabellini 
(2000); and Perotti  (1996). 
a.  Regressions 8-1 through  8-3 use transfers  as a share of GDP as the dependent  variable  and data for 1991-94 from Milesi- 
Ferretti,  Perotti,  and  Rostagno  (forthcoming).  Regression  8-4 uses social spending  as a share  of GDP as the dependent  variable  and 
data for 1960-98 from Persson and  Tabellini  (2000). All specifications include a constant (not reported).  t statistics are reported 
in parentheses.  * denotes significance at the 5 percent  level, ** at the 1 percent  level. 
b.  Measure of the percentage of a district's vote needed to capture a seat, expressed in natural logarithms. From Perotti 
(1996). 
c.  Exports  plus imports  as a share  of GDP. 
d.  Equals one in a regime where all seats in a district  are awarded  to the party  that wins the district. 
The  regression  in column  8-2 adds  a measure  of openness  (exports  plus 
imports,  divided  by GDP).  This variable  turns  out to be insignificant.  Fol- 
lowing  MFPR,  we also explored  Rodrik's  specification  of openness,  which 
includes  a variable  representing  the interaction  of terms-of-trade  shocks 
with openness,  but we did not find a significant  relationship  (results  not 
shown; MFPR  report  the same result). Column 8-3 reports  the MFPR 
result  using the entire  sample,  including  Latin  America.  The proportion- 
ality variable  is still significant, but the size of the coefficient is much 
lower and  less precisely estimated.  (Note that  openness  is still insignifi- 
cant.)  Figure  3, which plots transfers  as a share  of GDP against  the mea- 
sure of proportionality  for the OECD  countries  (top panel) and for the 
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Figure  3. Relationship  between  Transfers  and the Degree  of 
Proportional  Representation 
OECD countries 
Transfers  (percent  of GDP) 
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Proportionalitya 
Source: Data for 1991-94 from the OECD;  Milesi-Ferretti,  Perotti,  and Rostagno  (forthcoming);  and Perotti  (1996). 
a.  Measure  of the percentage  of a district's  voe  needed to capture  a seat, expressed  in natural  logarithms.  From  Perotti  (1996). 
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Latin  American  countries  (bottom  panel), shows why: the correlation  for 
the OECD  countries  is very strong  and  positive  whereas  that  for the Latin 
American  countries  is very weak and  negative. 
Column  8-4 in table  8 uses the PT data  set, which allows us to expand 
the set of countries.  We use their  specification.  In particular,  in addition 
to the majoritarian  variable, PT focus on another political variable, 
namely,  whether  or not a country  has a presidential  regime.  Note that  one 
should  expect a negative  sign on both the presidential  and  the majoritar- 
ian  variable.  Neither,  however,  is significant  in this  large  sample  (nor  is the 
openness  variable).  If we restrict  the sample  to the OECD  countries,  the 
two political variables come much closer to significance (results not 
shown), but the MFPR measure of proportionality  seems to be more 
strongly  correlated  with the dependent  variable  than  do the PT variables. 
Openness  is insignificant  in the OECD  subsample  as well. 
The bottom  line seems to be that, for OECD  countries,  a measure  of 
proportionality  of the  electoral  system  is highly  correlated  with  the amount 
of government  transfers.  This correlation  is much  weaker  or nonexistent 
for  developing  countries.  The  openness  variable  is not significant  after  one 
controls  for political  variables. 
If we interpret  the coefficient  on proportional  representation  as reflect- 
ing a causal relationship,  the cross-country  regressions  just described 
suggest  that  if the United  States  had  an electoral  system  similar  to that  of, 
say, Sweden,  the welfare  states  in the two countries  would  be very simi- 
lar.  This  narrow  interpretation  of political  explanations  is incomplete,  how- 
ever.  The electoral  system is only one of the politico-institutional  forces 
that  have led the United States to diverge  from Europe.  In addition,  the 
electoral system may itself be endogenous  to other  variables,  including 
attitudes  toward  the poor,  which  we discuss  later. 
One may argue  that,  in the United  States,  the present  electoral  system 
was chosen and  maintained  precisely  because  it supported  certain  policy 
outcomes.  Post-World  War  II France  went back and  forth  from more to 
less proportionality,  in part  to suit the needs of its various  leaders.41  Italy 
recently  moved  to a less proportional  rule  in response  to the  perceived  fail- 
ures  (including  in fiscal  matters)  of the previous  proportional  system.  New 
41.  In 1958 President Charles de Gaulle changed the proportional system of the Fourth 
Republic, making it more majoritarian.  President Fran,ois Mitterrand  reintroduced propor- 
tionality in 1986. 
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Zealand  recently made a move in the opposite direction.  Nevertheless, 
electoral  laws  have  a certain  "stickiness"  and  do not  change  often.  Our  pre- 
ferred  interpretation  is that  although  electoral  systems  in part  reflect  deeper 
aspects  of the societies  that  create  them,  they  also have  an important  direct 
effect on redistribution. 
THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL  HISTORY. No discussion of political vari- 
ables would be complete without  taking a historical  perspective.  Three 
monumental  historical  forces distinguish  the United  States  from  Europe: 
the Civil  War,  the "open  frontier"  in the  American  West,  and  the absence  of 
a large  and  influential  socialist  or communist  party. 
Skocpol notes that, at the end of the nineteenth  century,  the United 
States  had  a minimal  welfare  state  similar  to that  of the  European  countries 
at  the time.42  The  welfare  system  that  did  exist was based  on veterans'  pen- 
sions  that  grew  more  and  more  generous  over  time and  had  more  and  more 
relaxed  eligibility  requirements.  Several  social reformers  viewed  this pro- 
gram  as the steppingstone  toward  a universal  social security  system.  How- 
ever, their efforts were halted by several factors. One of these was a 
general  mistrust  in the administration  of the  veterans  program,  and  another 
the fact that it emerged from the divisive experience of the Civil War, 
rather  than  from a cohesive one such as an external  war.  Yet another  was 
that  the U.S. courts  during  this period  systematically  rejected  any legisla- 
tion that  was perceived  as anti-business.  In doing so, they appealed  to the 
principle  of protection  of private  property  against  government  interven- 
tion; often the doctrine  of freedom  of contract  was invoked.  Most strik- 
ingly,  in  1895  the  courts  declared the  U.S.  income  tax  to  be 
unconstitutional,  and  it took a constitutional  amendment  to undo  this deci- 
sion.43  The pro-property  actions  of the courts  were influenced  both  by the 
U.S. Constitution,  which  was designed  by property  owners  in part  to pro- 
tect property  from democracy's  excesses, and by incentives that firms 
created  to influence  judges. 
Different legal systems (for example, the French  versus the Anglo- 
Saxon system) attribute  very different  roles to the courts,  whose institu- 
tional structure  also differs across countries.44  The involvement  of the 
42.  Skocpol  (1992). 
43. The Supreme  Court's  decision  in this case was far  from  a foregone  conclusion.  The 
United  States  had  had  a functioning  income  tax  during  the  Civil  War,  which  the  court  did  not 
challenge. 
44.  See Glaeser  and  Shleifer  (2001a)  for a recent  discussion. 
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courts  in social legislation in the United States has been a constant  fea- 
ture  of the U.S. experience,  unlike  that  in countries  whose  legal tradition  is 
based on the French  or the German  model. Indeed,  the power and inde- 
pendence  of the  U.S. courts  are  unique,  unmatched  even  in England,  where 
parliamentary  dominance  is much  more  established.  In the United  King- 
dom, the House of Lords  was the closest equivalent  to the U.S. Supreme 
Court  until  its power  was stripped  from  it in the triumph  of parliamentary 
democracy. 
Given the relative  failure  of public  provision  of welfare  in the United 
States at the end of the nineteenth  century,  social assistance  took a turn 
toward  private initiatives, which permeate U.S. society even today.45 
Skocpol,  Ganz,  and  Munson  document  the active  role of a varied  universe 
of civic associations  that  provide  many different  forms of assistance  to 
46  of"  their members and target groups.  Many of these organizations  have 
national  coverage.  Obviously,  these private  organizations  fall well short 
of providing  the kind of social protection  that a European  government 
would offer. However,  this is another  example of the fact, documented 
above,  that  private  charities  in the United  States  tend  to substitute  some- 
what  for the lower  provision  of public  assistance. 
The open frontier  in a country  of immigrants  strengthened  individual- 
istic feelings  and  beliefs in equality  of opportunities  rather  than  equality  of 
outcomes.  In fact,  one may  argue  that  self-selection  led to a systematic  dif- 
ference  between  those Europeans  who migrated  to the United  States  and 
those  who did not.  The former  might  have  been  those  that,  ceteris  paribus, 
were more responsive to individual incentives and less risk averse. This, of 
course, contributed to cementing an anti-statist feeling that still pervades 
American  culture. 
A related  factor  is the lower population  density of the United States. 
Redistribution  in many  countries  has  been  a response  to the  physical  power 
of the poor and the threat  of riot and revolution. Daron  Acemoglu and 
James  Robinson  argue  that  democracy  in Europe  is itself a response  to this 
power.47  Although  America  saw its share  of class-related  violence in the 
45.  A particularly interesting example at the end of the nineteenth century was the role 
of women's organizations in providing family assistance to mothers and children (Skocpol, 
1992). 
46.  Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson (2000). 
47.  Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). 
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late  nineteenth  century,48  and  experienced  riots  in the 1930s  and  the 1960s, 
its geographic  decentralization  has generally  meant  that  the United  States 
has never witnessed a rebellion that threatened  the centers of govern- 
ment.49  In contrast,  popular  uprisings  in Paris  led to changes of govern- 
ment  on at least four occasions.  Berlin  and  London  were more stable  but 
still faced considerably  more  popular  unrest  than  Washington,  D.C. 
Indeed,  across OECD  countries  population  density is found  to have a 
significant  positive  effect on redistribution:  38.6 percent.  Elsewhere  one of 
us has argued  that urban  density facilitates riots and rebellions.50  More 
generally,  the historical  evidence  from  countries  like France  suggests  that 
urban  density  leads  to the  political  empowerment  of the  poor,  certainly  rel- 
ative  to the dispersed  farmers  of the eighteenth  century.  Hence  America's 
low population  density  may also have  contributed  to its stability  and  rela- 
tive lack of redistribution.5' 
The absence of a large and cohesive socialist workers'  movement  in 
the United States is another  critical  factor  in shaping  redistributive  poli- 
cies. Marx  and  Engels (especially  the latter)  were already  aware  of what 
we now call "American  exceptionalism."  They attributed  it to the lack of 
a feudal  period  in American  history:  because  it missed  this phase,  Ameri- 
can society failed to create the basis of clear-cut class differences.52 
Already  in the nineteenth  century,  the workers'  movements  that  could  have 
become the precursors  of a socialist party  professed an "ideology that 
reflected  the strong  belief of many  Jacksonian  Americans  in equality  of 
opportunity,  rather  than  equality  of results."53  In fact, workers'  groups  in 
the United States were "social Darwinist,  not Marxist."54  Werner  Som- 
bart,  himself  then  a socialist,  argued  that  American  capitalism  may create 
inequality  but offered opportunities  to all. He wrote that "Equality  and 
Liberty  ...  [for  American  workers]  are  not empty  ideas  and  vague  dreams 
48.  See Skowronek  (1982). 
49.  The Civil War  was, of course, fundamentally  a rebellion of the Southern  elites, 
who can  be interpreted  as fighting  for the right  to take  from  the  poor  without  compensation. 
50. DiPasquale  and  Glaeser  (1998). 
51. It is also possible  that  density  has a second  effect  on redistribution,  working  through 
altruism.  If proximity  creates  empathy,  one might  expect  support  for welfare  to be stronger 
in denser  countries. 
52. For  an extensive  review  of the writings  of Marx  and  Engels  concerning  the  Ameri- 
can case see Lipset  and  Marks  (2000). 
53. Lipset  and  Marks  (2000, p. 21). 
54. Lipset  and  Marks  (2000, p. 20). 
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as they are  for the European  working  class."55  In other  words,  class strug- 
gle was (and is) not "second  nature"  to the American  workers.  In Som- 
bart's  words,  "In  America  there  is not the stigma  of being the class apart 
that  almost  all European  workers  have about  them."56 
The fact that the American working class was formed by waves of 
immigration  also contributed  to preventing  the formation  of a European- 
style class consciousness.  Ethnic  divisions  within  the working  class (early 
Protestant  immigrants  on one side, new Catholic  immigrants  on the other) 
were  as strongly  felt as class-based  cleavages.57  Even  contemporary  social- 
ist leaders (including Engels) recognized the powerful effect of ethnic 
fragmentation  within  the union  movement. 
The Great  Depression could have galvanized socialist ideals in the 
United  States.  However,  with  the New Deal, President  Franklin  Roosevelt 
and  the Democratic  Party  managed  to co-opt  important  fringes  of the left, 
which  might  otherwise  have strengthened  the Socialist  Party.  At the same 
time, the Socialists persisted  in not understanding  and in not accommo- 
dating  "distinctive  elements of American  culture-antistatism and indi- 
vidualism."58  These cultural  features were of course at odds with the 
socialist  emphasis  on taxation  and  heavy  government  intervention.  Amer- 
ican socialists  were systematically  less successful  than  their  counterparts 
in other  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  such  as Australia,  Canada,  and  the United 
Kingdom  itself, in working  with  these  cultural  characteristics.  Finally,  one 
should  not forget the role of repression  of communism  and socialism in 
post-World  War  II America. 
The electoral system also made it difficult for a third  party  to move 
into the political arena,  as emphasized, for instance, by Lipset.59  This 
observation  is consistent  with the econometric  evidence  described  above 
on the importance  of proportional  representation.  However,  the interpre- 
tation  is different  from  those  of the models  sketched  above.  The U.S. elec- 
toral  rules, by making  it difficult  for third  parties  to enter,  contributed  to 
the failure  of socialist  and  communist  parties  in the United  States. 
Additionally,  the United  States  evolved  as a federal  system  rather  than 
as a unitary,  centralized  country  like several  of today's  European  countries. 
55.  Sombert (1905, p. 75). 
56.  Sombert (1905, p. 76). 
57.  See Lipset and Marks (2000) and the vast literature cited therein on this point. 
58.  Lipset and Marks (2000, p. 266). 
59.  Lipset (1996). 
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To  the  extent  that  the  redistributive  role of the  central  government  is in part 
delegated  to subnational  levels of government,  the geographic  mobility  of 
individuals  and  tax competition  between  subnational  governments  might 
limit government  size.60  Even though  the cross-country  evidence on the 
relationship  between  fiscal decentralization  and  the size of government  is 
inconclusive  (after  all, Germany,  too, is a federal  republic),61  the fact that 
many  public  goods in the United  States  are  locally  provided  may affect  the 
extent  of redistribution  to the  poor.  Think,  for instance,  of people  fleeing  to 
the suburbs  to escape the taxation  needed to finance inner-city  schools. 
However,  the choices concerning  these fiscal arrangements  and  the rela- 
tionship  between  different  levels of governments  are  clearly  endogenous  to 
preferences  for redistribution. 
As a final aside,  it is worth  reemphasizing  that  all political  rules  are  in 
some sense endogenous  and  the outcome  of deeper  features  of the coun- 
try in question.  The writers  of the U.S. Constitution  chose to establish  a 
federal  system  with strong  separation  of powers,  a bill of rights,  and  pro- 
portional  representation.  It is very clear  that  the Founding  Fathers,  James 
Madison in particular,  were focused on protecting  American citizens 
against  the "encroaching  spirit  of power"  and  "the  violence of faction."62 
The authors  of the Constitution  make  it clear  in the Federalist  Papers  that 
they are disturbed  by the possibility that, in an unfettered  democracy, 
"measures  are  too often decided,  not according  to the rules  of justice and 
the rights of the minor  party,  but by the superior  force of an interested 
and  over-bearing  majority."63  They  therefore  tried  to design  the Constitu- 
tion so as to protect  private  rights  against  factions,  even if those factions 
include  a majority  of the population. 
Of course,  the United  States  is not the only country  with a constitution 
designed  to limit the majority's  power  by protecting  property.  In the pre- 
modem era, electoral  rules designed by elites customarily  attempted  to 
protect  property  against  majoritarian  redistribution.  However,  the big dif- 
ference between the United States and most of Europe  is the former's 
greater  political stability,  which means  that  eighteenth-century  rules are 
still in effect today.  Whereas  many  European  monarchies  were  toppled  by 
60.  For a recent survey of the literature on this point see Oates (1999). 
61.  In fact, in many cases decentralization has led to an increase in spending, and it is 
often a source of fiscal imbalance. 
62.  The Federalist, No.  10. 
63.  The Federalist, No.  10. 
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world  wars  and  revolutions,  the United  States  has had  an enormously  sta- 
ble system of government.  Indeed,  across  countries  we see a significant 
relationship  between  the date  of the  most  recent  constitution  and  the  extent 
of redistribution.  In a sample  of sixteen OECD  countries,  the correlation 
between social spending  and the year of the most recent  constitution  is 
52 percent."'  Indeed,  America's  stability  may be one of the true  causes  of 
its electoral  rules  that  seem to limit  redistribution. 
Political factors that influence U.S. exceptionalism  run deeper  than 
differences  in electoral  rules.  It is highly  unlikely  that,  holding  the rest of 
history constant  (including  the endurance  of the U.S. Constitution,  the 
Civil War,  the waves of immigration,  ethnic  fragmentation,  and  the diffi- 
culty  of establishing  a unified  socialist  working  class  movement),  a change 
in the  electoral  rules  for  Congress  would  have  turned  the  U.S. welfare  state 
into  one resembling  that  of France  or Sweden.  In addition,  Americans  may 
not have wanted  a change  in their  electoral  rules,  precisely  because  they 
feared  the consequences  of such  a change  on policy outcomes. 
Behavioral Explanations 
The previous  section  explored  reasons  why political  institutions  could 
explain  different  levels of redistribution  in the United  States  and  Europe, 
even if the demand  for redistribution  were the same in both  places. Now 
we look at theories of why the demand  for redistribution  might differ 
between  Europe  and  the United  States,  and  in particular  why the median 
voter  in Europe  might  be more  positively  disposed  toward  the poor than 
the median  voter  in the United  States. 
The economic  literature  on the determinants  of altruism  is limited.  We 
know of two main strands.  First, a substantial  body of work, following 
Gary  Becker,  argues  that  people like people of their  own race more  than 
they like people of other  races.65  Second,  a smaller  and  more  recent  body 
of work  explores  the concept  of reciprocal  altruism:  that  people  feel altru- 
istic toward  those who are  good to them  and  vengeful toward  those who 
64.  The sample excludes  both the Netherlands and Belgium. Although their constitu- 
tions  date from  1814  and 1830,  respectively,  change  in these  countries  has been quite 
dramatic, as they have moved away from monarchism toward republicanism over the past 
200 years. If we include these countries and weight the sample by population, the correla- 
tion is 58 percent. However, the correlation is only 9.5 percent if we include Belgium and 
the Netherlands and do not use population weights. 
65.  Becker (1957). 
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take  advantage  of them.  In the welfare  context,  reciprocal  altruism  means 
that  people will vehemently  oppose welfare if they believe that  welfare 
recipients  are  taking  advantage  of the system. 
RACIAL PREJUDICE. Becker's  model, which assumes  that  people of one 
race  dislike  people  of another  race,  launched  the modem  economic  litera- 
ture  on racial  discrimination.  There  is, of course,  a vast literature  on dif- 
ferent  aspects  of discrimination.  Gordon  Allport's  classic sociology text 
describes  the early work  in this area  that  shows discrimination  in a wide 
array  of settings.66  More  recent  work  has shown  the impact  of racial  dis- 
crimination  on markets  ranging  from  baseball  cards  to housing.67  Alesina 
and  La Ferrara  show that  participation  in social activities  involving  direct 
contact  between  individuals  is lower in racially  fragmented  communities 
in the United  States.68  The same  authors  show that  trust  is higher  in more 
racially  homogeneous  communities.69  Work  by Glaeser  and  others  docu- 
ments  experimentally  that  people  of different  races  are  more  likely  to cheat 
one another.70 
Racial heterogeneity  seems to be a significant  factor in the political 
process.  Alesina, Reza Baqir,  and  Caroline  Hoxby show that  individuals 
prefer to form racially homogeneous political jurisdictions.71 Denise 
DiPasquale and Glaeser document  that racial heterogeneity is closely 
linked  to the incidence  of riots.72  Other  forms  of heterogeneity  (in national 
origin and  religion) appear  to be much less important.  In other  parts  of 
the world,  religious  cleavages  (for  instance)  may  be much  more  deeply  felt 
than  racial  ones, but  in the United  States  the most salient  dividing  line is 
race. 
We  do not  really  know  why interpersonal  altruism  seems  linked  to race. 
It is possible  that  human  beings are  hard-wired  to dislike  people with dif- 
ferent  skin  color.  A more  reasonable  theory  is that  human  beings  are  genet- 
ically programmed  to form  in-group,  out-group  associations  and  to prefer 
members  of what they perceive as their  own group.  An extensive social 
66.  Allport (1954). 
67.  On discrimination in baseball cards, see Nardinelli and Simon (1990). Taeuber and 
Taeuber (1965)  is the classic  text on housing market segregation, and Cutler, Glaeser, and 
Vigdor (1999) trace its evolution. 
68.  Alesina and La Ferrara  (2000). 
69.  Alesina and La Ferrara  (2001). 
70.  Glaeser and others (2000). 
71.  Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2000). 
72.  DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998). 
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psychology  literature  documents  individuals'  tendencies  to favor  members 
of their  own group;  it also reveals  the malleability  of group  definitions.  A 
particularly  famous experiment  randomly  allotted boys into different 
teams  and  then  documented  how these  boys became  deeply  hostile  toward 
members of rival teams. According to this view, race may serve as a 
marker  for in-group  status,  but  it need not be such a marker. 
Other  markers  are available  for group  identification,  but, again,  in the 
United  States  race  seems  to be the strongest.  In  fact,  political  entrepreneurs 
in the United States  often try to use race as an excuse for expropriation. 
For  example,  Dinesh  D'Souza argues  that  modem  racism  came  about  as a 
justification  for the profitable  slave trade.73  During the post-Civil War 
reconstruction,  Southern  political leaders  pushed  a racist  philosophy  as 
an  excuse  for  taking  on the  basis  of race  (and  not income).  We  do not  know 
why altruism  seems to be lower  between  races  than  within  them,  but  cer- 
tainly a vast amount  of evidence suggests that  racial prejudice  is a real 
and  enduring  feature  of the  American  landscape. 
The  history  of American  welfare  suggests  that  enemies  of welfare  often 
used  race  to defeat  attempts  at redistribution  in the  post-Civil  War  period. 
For example, during  the populist era in the late nineteenth  century,  the 
United States  first contemplated  significant  government  action  to redis- 
tribute  income  toward  poorer  Americans  (specifically  farmers)  other  than 
Civil  War  veterans.  In the South,  political  action  against  such  populist  pro- 
posals frequently  took the form of racial politics. C. Vann  Woodward 
describes  how conservative  Democrats  in the South  used  racial  politics  to 
defeat  the  left-wing  Readjuster  movement.74  The  poll tax and  literacy  tests, 
which  reduced  voting  by the  poor  of both  races  in the South,  were  enacted 
because they disproportionately  disenfranchised  African-Americans.  A 
later  example  of how racial  animosity  was used to defeat  left-leaning  pol- 
itics is George  Wallace-the famous  proponent  of race-based  policies in 
Alabama-who  originally  ran  for governor  in 1958 on a primarily  anti- 
rich ticket. He was defeated,  in that  first  run,  by a more  racist  candidate 
who was endorsed  by the Ku Klux Klan. More recently,  national  cam- 
paigns  of relatively  anti-welfare  candidates  have often attempted  to play 
73.  D'Souza (1995). In particular,  he claims that the Enlightenment had made slavery of 
one's peers unacceptable, making it necessary to define blacks as an out-group that could 
44ethically" be enslaved. 
74.  Woodward (1955). 
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the race card  (some observers  have alleged the same about  the presiden- 
tial campaigns  of both  Ronald  Reagan  and  the elder  George  Bush). 
A natural  generalization  of race-based  theory  is that  Americans  think  of 
the poor as members  of some different  group  than  themselves, whereas 
Europeans  think  of the poor as members  of their  own group.  Racial dif- 
ferences  between  the poor and  the nonpoor  in the United  States  will tend 
to create  the  perception  of the  poor  as "other,"  but  geographic  or social  iso- 
lation  might  do this as well. If the poor  in the United  States  are  geograph- 
ically or socially isolated, this might create a situation  where nonpoor 
Americans  have little sympathy  for the poor.  Furthermore,  as Lipset  has 
noted,75  several polls suggest that a large majority  of white Americans 
believe  that  African-Americans  would  be as wealthy  as whites  if they  tried 
hard  enough. 
Hard  evidence on the importance  of race and in-group status in the 
support  for welfare  corroborates  these  anecdotes.  Erzo  Luttmer,  using  data 
from the General  Social Survey  in the United States, finds that support 
for welfare  is greater  among  people who live close to many  welfare  recip- 
ients who are of the same race.76  This supports  the idea that  geographic 
isolation  from  the poor  may lead  Americans  to think  of them  as members 
of some out-group. 
Conversely,  support  for welfare  is lower among  people who live near 
welfare  recipients  of a different  race.  The difference  between  within-race 
and  across-race  effects seems to mean  that  people  have  a negative,  hostile 
reaction  when they see welfare  recipients  of a different  race, and a sym- 
pathetic reaction when they see welfare recipients of their own race. 
Alesina,  Baqir,  and  William  Easterly  use data  on U.S. cities, metropolitan 
areas,  and counties  to look at the effect of race on redistribution.77  They 
find that  states  that  are  more  ethnically  fragmented  spend  a smaller  frac- 
tion of their  budget  on social services and  productive  public goods, and 
more  on crime  prevention  and  (probably)  on patronage. 
This racial argument  provides  us with our first reason  why tastes for 
redistribution  might be lower in the United States.78  The United States 
is much more racially heterogeneous than Europe, and importantly, 
75.  Lipset (1996, p. 133). 
76.  Luttmer (2001). 
77.  Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999). 
78.  This view is shared by Lipset (1996),  among others. 
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American  minorities  are  disproportionately  represented  among  the poor. 
It could be argued  that  ethnolinguistic  heterogeneity  within some Euro- 
pean  countries  (such  as Belgium)  is as great  as racial  heterogeneity  in the 
United States.  Furthermore,  it is at least possible that  this heterogeneity 
creates  antipathy  that  is as robust  as the race-based  animosity  observed 
in the United  States. However,  in no European  country  is there  a minor- 
ity that  is as poor,  relative  to the rest of the population,  as blacks in the 
United States. In 1999 the poverty  rate among non-Hispanic  whites in 
the United States was 7.7 percent, compared  with 23.6 percent among 
blacks. Non-Hispanic  whites made up 70.7 percent  of the U.S. popula- 
tion but  only 46.1 percent  of the poor;  in metropolitan  areas,  fewer than 
40 percent of the poor were non-Hispanic whites. Thus any income- 
based transfer scheme will  disproportionately transfer income to 
African-Americans,  Hispanics,  and other  minority  races. If people dis- 
like transferring  money to people of a different  color, this could possi- 
bly explain the redistribution gap between the United States and 
Europe.79 
We use several  methods  to quantify  this hypothesis.  First,  we look at 
racial  heterogeneity  across  countries.  Table  9 reports  two regressions  that 
start  with the Persson  and  Tabellini  specifications  and  introduce  fraction- 
alization  measures.  In both,  the dependent  variable  is social spending  as a 
share  of GDP.  In column  9-1 we add  the now-standard  measure  of ethno- 
linguistic fractionalization  widely used in the literature.80  This variable 
gives the probability  that two randomly  drawn  individuals  in the same 
country  speak  different  languages.  Although  the raw  relationship  between 
this variable  and  redistribution  is quite high (a correlation  coefficient  of 
41 percent),  when  other  controls  are  added  the coefficient  on this variable 
becomes  insignificant. 
Of course,  this variable  does not capture  all instances  of racial  hetero- 
geneity.  To correct  this problem,  we constructed  a new variable  that  cap- 
79. The  closest  European  equivalent  to this  phenomenon  is anti-Arab  feeling  among  the 
French  or anti-Gypsy  sentiment  in Eastern  Europe,  where  antipathy  is aimed  at extremely 
poor  groups.  The  politics  surrounding  these  groups  supports  the  importance  of race,  as right- 
wing leaders  (such as Jean-Marie  LePen  in France  or Jbrg  Haider  in Austria)  emphasize 
their  hostility  to these  poor  minorities. 
80. This  variable  is the same  one used by Easterly  and  Levine  (1997). See appendix  B 
for more  details. 
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Table  9.  Cross-Country  Regressions  Explaining  Transfers  with Ethnolinguistic  and 
Racial Fractionalizationa 
Independent  variable  9-1  9-2 
Ethnolinguistic  fractionalizationb  -1.864 
(2.863) 
Racial  fractionalizationc  -7.538* 
(3.378) 
GDP  per  capita  0.402  1.918 
(1.351)  (1.289) 
Percent  of population  aged 15-64  0.628**  0.327 
(0.210)  (0.184) 
Majoritarian  regime  dummyd  -1.381  -2.305 
(1.502)  (1.302) 
Asia dummy  -1.770  -0.092 
(3.273)  (4.221) 
Caribbean  dummy  -4.508  -2.981 
(2.653)  (2.548) 
Latin  America  dummy  -2.733  -2.416 
(1.812)  (1.847) 
Summary  statistic 
No. of observations  56  55 
R  2  0.69  0.69 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using data for 1960-98 from Persson and  Tabellini  (2000). 
a.  The dependent variable for each specification is social spending as a share of GDP.  All specifications include a constant 
(not reported).  t statistics are reported  in parentheses.  * denotes significance at the 5 percent  level, ** at the I percent  level. 
b. Probability  that two randomly  selected individuals  from a population  speak different  languages. 
c.  Probability  that two randomly  selected individuals  from a population  are of different  races. 
d.  Equals one in a regime where all seats in a district  are awarded  to the party  that wins the district. 
tures  differences  in racial  origin  rather  than  language  (see appendix  B for 
data  sources).  In many  cases the two coincide,  but  not always.  For  exam- 
ple, Belgium would be classified as a very fragmented  country  in terms 
of language  but  more  uniform  in terms  of race.  Latin  America  is much  less 
uniform  in terms  of race  than  in terms  of language.  We obtained  informa- 
tion about  racial composition from the sources detailed in appendix  B 
and  created  a new racial  fragmentation  variable.  The correlation  between 
this variable  and  redistribution  is 66 percent. 
The regression  reported  in column 9-2 adds this new variable,  which 
turns  out to be significant  at the 5 percent  level. The majoritarian  regime 
variable  still has the expected  negative  sign (but  is still insignificant).  Fig- 
ure 4 displays the relationship  between the dependent  variable  and our 
measure  of racial  fractionalization.  The United States  is not far from  the 
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Figure  4. Relationship  between  Social Spending  and Racial Fractionalization 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  based on data  from Persson  and  Tabellini  (2000). 
a. Average  for 1960-98. 
b. Probability  that  two randomly  selected individuals  from a population  are of different  races. Measured  over 1990-98. 
regression  line. The European  countries  are  racially very homogeneous 
and,  as we know,  have a large  measure  of social spending.81 
We also used micro evidence on this topic from the General Social 
Survey.  This survey,  used by Luttmer  and by Alesina and La Ferrara  to 
address  related  issues, provides  annual  data  on between 1,200 and  2,400 
people  from 1972 to the present  (see appendix  B for details).  We  focus on 
the survey  question  that  asks  whether  the state  should  spend  more  on wel- 
fare.  Possible answers  are  that  the state should  spend  more, spend  about 
the same amount,  or spend  less; we quantify  these answers  by assigning 
81.  Note that  the strong  inverse  correlation  observed  in figure  4 is not an artifact  of 
failing  to control  for income  per  capita.  In fact, an even stronger  correlation  would  appear 
if one plotted  the residual  of a regression  of SSI benefits  against  income  per  capita  against 
our  measure  of racial  fragmentation. 
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them scores of 1, /2,  and  0, respectively.  This question  has been asked  in 
most survey  years  and  seems to provide  the best information  available  on 
people's  desires  for more  welfare. 
Importantly,  this question  is difficult to use even in time-series  com- 
parisons  within the United States. Since the question  asks people about 
ideal  spending  on welfare  relative  to current  spending,  it is not appropriate 
for comparisons  when the level of current  spending  has changed.  Cross- 
country  comparisons  are obviously impossible. A Swede who opposes 
more spending on welfare in Sweden is not the same as a Texan who 
opposes more spending  on welfare  in Texas.  The Swede's answer  to the 
question obviously reflects the already high welfare spending in that 
country. 
However,  we present  in table 10 results  using, as the dependent  vari- 
able, answers  to this question  for the United  States  in a single period.  The 
regression  reported  in column 10-1 shows the basic results  for the entire 
sample  (covering 1972-98), which mirror  those of Luttmer.82  There  is a 
large,  negative  income effect. The impact  of education  is nonmonotonic: 
high school dropouts  want more welfare spending  than  do high school 
graduates,  but  people  with  graduate  degrees  favor  increased  welfare  spend- 
ing even more  than  do high school dropouts.  The pro-welfare  orientation 
of the highly educated  is an interesting  phenomenon  that  fits with stereo- 
types but is still not well understood.  People in big cities appear  to be 
much  more  pro-welfare,  probably  because  people  in those cities are  more 
likely to live around  the  poor.  Finally,  there  are  weak  effects  of age (results 
not reported)  and  marital  status.  The gender  of respondents  is not found 
to matter  at all. 
Instead,  the single largest  coefficient  in the regression  is that  on race. 
African-Americans  are 23 percent  more  likely than  other  respondents  to 
say that  welfare  spending  should  be increased.  Although  we are  not sur- 
prised  that  blacks  support  welfare  spending  more  than  whites-race could 
well be correlated  with  permanent  income,  for  example-the magnitude  of 
the coefficient suggests that  the impact  of race on the desire  for redistri- 
bution  is far  greater  than  any  income  effect.  These  results  are  very  consis- 
tent  with  those  of Alesina  and  La Ferrara,  who look at a different  question 
from the same survey  concerning  support  for government  redistribution 
to fight income inequality.83  These authors  find similarly  that  whites are 
82. Luttmer  (2001). 
83. Alesina  and  La Ferrara  (2001). 
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Table 10. Explaining  Support  for Welfare  in the United States with Racial Variablesa 
Independent  variable  10-1  10-2  10-3  10-4 
Black  0.232** 
(28.55) 
Income  {0.020**  {0.019**  {0.022**  {0.018** 
(19.78)  (17.19)  (5.36)  (13.54) 
Female  0.007  0.009  0.032  0.010 
(1.35)  (1.67)  (1.94)  (1.39) 
Married  {0.033**  {0.038**  -0.016  {0.036** 
(5.82)  (6.19)  (0.91)  (4.58) 
No. of children  0.006**  0.006**  0.010  0.007** 
(3.96)  (3.38)  (1.77)  (3.04) 
High  school  education  or less  0.042**  0.042**  -0.010  0.048** 
(5.84)  (5.56)  (0.38)  (5.08) 
Some  college education  -0.002  -0.002  -0.005  0.003 
(0.28)  (0.28)  (0.21)  (0.26) 
College  graduate  0.031**  0.030**  0.029  0.025* 
(3.62)  (3.40)  (1.16)  (2.22) 
Beyond  college  0.106**  0.107**  0.080*  0.133** 
(8.76)  (8.65)  (2.47)  (8.20) 
Population  of home  city,  0.010**  0.010**  0.01  1**  0.010** 
in logarithms  (7.77)  (7.21)  (2.61)  (5.90) 
Ratio  of blacks  to total  state  -0.044 
population  (1.14) 
Believe  that  blacks  are  lazyb  {0.030** 
(4.27) 
Had  a black  person  over  for  0.043** 
dinner  recently  (5.38) 
Summary  statistic 
No. of observations  20,848  18,157  1,921  11,048 
R  2  0.10  0.04  0.04  0.05 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using data for 1972-98 from the General  Social Survey (see appendix  B). 
a.  The dependent variable for each specification is respondents' opinions on the current  level of welfare spending in their 
state; possible responses were "too much" (scored as I), "about  right"  (scored as /2),  or "too little" (scored as 0). Regressions 
10-2 through  10-4 use data  from  white respondents  only.  All specifications  include  a constant  (not reported).  t statistics  are  reported 
in parentheses.  * denotes significance at the 5 percent  level, ** at the I percent  level. 
b. Measured  on a scale from 0 to 7, where 7 indicates strongest  belief. 
much  less likely than  nonwhites  to support  such redistribution,  and this 
effect is of a magnitude  similar  to that  reported  above. 
In column 10-2, we look at support  for welfare  among  whites only, to 
see whether  the results  further  support  the importance  of race.  The  regres- 
sion also looks at the impact  of the share  of blacks in the population  of 
the respondent's  state of residence. The theory suggests that whites in 
more  heterogeneous  states  should  be less likely  to support  welfare.  We  find 
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evidence  that  points  in this direction,  but  the effect is weak  and  not statis- 
tically significant. 
In column 10-3 we look at whether  whites who believe that  blacks  are 
lazy are less likely to support  welfare. A link between this measure  of 
racial  prejudice  and  support  for welfare  is made  by Martin  Gilens.84  This 
survey  question  should  be interpreted  as an attempt  to get at both racial 
prejudice  and, in particular,  opinions about  why blacks tend to be rela- 
tively poor. We again find that an effect is present but weak, perhaps 
because  people  do not answer  the question  honestly. 
In column 10-4 we look for a correlation  between personal  acquain- 
tance with blacks and support  for welfare, using the following survey 
question:  "During  the last few years,  has anyone  in your  family  brought  a 
friend  who was an  African  American  home for dinner?"  Only 27 percent 
of whites  say that  they  have.  Naturally,  this  variable  could  reflect  both  con- 
tact  or lack of contact  with blacks  and  underlying  hostility  or lack thereof 
toward  blacks.  People  who have  had  blacks  over  to dinner  are  indeed  more 
likely to support  increased  welfare;  there  is also a weakly negative  con- 
nection  between  this  personal  acquaintance  variable  and  belief that  blacks 
are  lazy (results  not shown). 
As a final  check,  we look at the  relationship  across  states  between  racial 
heterogeneity  and  the generosity  of welfare  payments.  To avoid  problems 
associated  with welfare  reform  in the mid-1990s, we use data  for 1990. 
Under  the AFDC  program  then  in existence,  as under  the TANF  program 
today,  states  have discretion  in the way they structure  their  welfare  pay- 
ments,  and  there  was and  is considerable  heterogeneity  in the  generosity  of 
these programs.  The dependent  variable  is the maximum  monthly  AFDC 
payment  to a family of three.  The explanatory  variable  is the share  of the 
population  that  is black.  If our  theory  is correct,  states  with  more  African- 
American  residents  should  have  less generous  programs. 
Figure  5 shows  that  this is the case. There  is a strong  negative  relation- 
ship  between  the generosity  of a state's  program  and  the share  of the state's 
population  that is black: the raw correlation  is 49 percent. It is worth 
emphasizing  that,  in all fifty  states,  blacks  are  a minority  of the  population, 
and in all fifty they are disproportionately  represented  among the poor. 
One possible confound  in this relationship  is the average  income of the 
state:  states  with a larger  share  of blacks  tend  to be poorer  and  may offer 
less generous  payments  for that  reason. However,  when we regress the 
84. Gilens (1999). 
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Figure  5. Relationship  between  Welfare  Benefit  and the Black Population  Share, by 
State, 1990 
Welfare  benefit  (dollars)a 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  based on data from the General  Social Survey (see appendix  B for details) and U.S. Government 
Printing  Office, 1998 Green  Book. 
a. Maximum  monthly  AFDC benefit  for a family of three. 
maximum  AFDC  payment  on both state  median  income and  the share  of 
the state  population  that  is black,  our  primary  result  is still significant.  The 
estimated  regression  is (standard  errors  are  in parentheses) 
maximum  AFDC  payment  = -149 - 692 x percent  black  + 0.017 x median  income 
(72) (131)  (0.002) 
N = 50, R2  = 0.71. 
These coefficients  indicate  that  a 1 percentage  point change  in the share 
of the population  that  is black  reduces  the maximum  monthly  AFDC  pay- 
ment  by $6.92, and  a $1,000 increase  in median  income  increases  the  max- 
imum payment by $17. These results confirm the strong connection 
between  racial  homogeneity  and  redistribution. 
Overall,  the cross-country  evidence,  the cross-state  evidence  (both  that 
of Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly and the work presented  here), and the 
survey  evidence given here (and that of Luttmer  and of Alesina and La 
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Ferrara)  all suggest  that  hostility  between  races  limits  support  for welfare. 
It is clear that  racial  heterogeneity  within  the United  States  is one of the 
most important  reasons  why the welfare  state  in America  is small. 
RECIPROCAL  ALTRUISM. A final  possible  explanation  of Europe-U.S.  dif- 
ferences  in redistribution  is reciprocal  altruism.  This simple idea is gen- 
erally credited to Robert  Trivers,  who argued  that animals evolved to 
respond  in kind  to the actions  of others;  that  is, a tit-for-tat  policy is simple 
and  generally  optimal.85  Mathew  Rabin  presents  an  economic  model  show- 
ing reciprocal altruism in action, and Paul Romer uses the taste for 
vengeance  (a specific  form  of reciprocal  altruism)  to understand  the poli- 
tics surrounding  Social Security.86 
Reciprocal  altruism  relates  to welfare  because  anti-welfare  forces gen- 
erally  try  to emphasize  that  welfare  recipients  are  taking  money  from  tax- 
payers  rather  than  working  to earn  a living. (A classic example  is Ronald 
Reagan's  apocryphal  welfare  queen  living  high  on taxpayer  dollars.)  Since 
the 1960s,  anti-welfare  politicians  have  emphasized  the claim  that  the  poor 
are  unworthy  of public  charity  and  are  cheating  the system.  It is easy to see 
why the nonworking  poor who receive income from working  taxpayers 
might  generate  resentment  and  hostility.  It is less easy to understand  why 
this force might  differ  between  the United  States  and  Europe. 
One thing, however,  is clear. Opinions about  the poor differ sharply 
between  the United  States and  Europe.  In Europe  the poor are generally 
thought  to be unfortunate,  but not personally  responsible  for their own 
condition.  For  example, according  to the World  Values  Survey,  whereas 
70 percent of western Germans  express the belief that  people are poor 
because  of imperfections  in society,  not their  own laziness, 70 percent  of 
Americans  hold the opposite  view. Responding  to another  World  Values 
Survey  question,  which asked  whether  poor  people could work  their  way 
out of poverty,  71 percent  of Americans  but  only 40 percent  of Europeans 
said that they could (see table 13 below). Most Americans  essentially 
believe that  anyone  can work  his or her  way out of poverty  by dint  of hard 
work, and that the poor remain  poor only because they refuse to put in 
this  effort.  Given  these  beliefs,  it is not surprising  that  Americans  think  that 
85. Trivers  (1971). Obviously,  simple tit-for-tat  policies will not dominate  complete 
rationality-in the absence  of reputation  concerns.  However,  for nonhuman  primates  (and 
perhaps  even for humans),  evolution  may  have  trouble  creating  complete  rationality. 
86. Rabin  (1993);  Romer  (1996). 
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the poor are undeserving  of welfare, whereas  Europeans  think that the 
poor  are  unfortunate  and  therefore  deserving  of welfare.87 
We therefore  repeated  the cross-country  regressions  in table  9 with an 
additional  variable:  the country  mean  of the percentage  who believe that 
income  differences  across  individuals  are  driven  by luck.  This  variable  has 
a significant  positive coefficient,  indicating  that  the more  people believe 
that  luck drives success, the larger  is the share  of social spending.  This 
holds even after  controlling  for all the other  right-hand-side  variables  in 
table 9, although  complete  data  on these variables  are available  for only 
twenty-nine  countries.88 
Indirect  evidence on American  attitudes  toward  the poor can also be 
taken  from  a paper  by Alesina, Rafael  Di Tella,  and  Robert  MacCulloch, 
which examines  the determinants  of happiness  in the United States and 
Europe.89  The  authors  find  that  most  of the  individual  characteristics  exam- 
ined influence happiness  in almost identical ways on both sides of the 
Atlantic. However, whereas more Europeans become less happy as 
inequality  in their  country  rises,  the  happiness  of Americans  is unrelated  to 
inequality  in their  state  of residence. 
What  forces might  be responsible  for these differences  in beliefs? We 
can  only speculate  at this  point,  but  there  are  a plethora  of plausible  expla- 
nations.  First,  such  beliefs might  reflect  an underlying  reality.  As table 11 
shows, there  is a strong  positive correlation  between  earnings  and  hours 
worked  in the United States. The median  American  male aged twenty- 
five to fifty-four  in the top income  quintile  works  forty-five  hours  a week, 
and the average  for this group  is forty-eight  hours  a week. Both of these 
numbers  are markedly  higher  than  those for all other  income quintiles. 
Young  American  males in the bottom  quintile work only twenty-seven 
hours  a week on average.  Even when the sample  is restricted  to full-time 
workers  (results  not shown),  it remains  true  that  poorer  U.S. workers  work 
far fewer  hours.  These  patterns  are  less common  in Europe.  For  example, 
in Switzerland  and Italy,  men in the bottom  income quintile  work more 
hours  than  men in the top quintile.  In Sweden,  the median  worker  works 
87. Lipset  (1996) reports  results  from  various  polls, all of which  suggest  that  an over- 
whelming  majority  believe  that  the poor  can lift themselves  out of poverty  if they try  hard 
enough. 
88. These  results  are  not reported  here  but  are  available  from  the authors  upon  request. 
89. Alesina,  Di Tella,  and  MacCulloch  (2001). 
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Table 11. Hours Worked  in Selected OECD Countries,  by Incomea 
Median/mean 
Nether-  Switzer-  United 
Income  France,  Germany,  Italy,  lands,  Sweden,  land,  States, 
quintile  1994  1994  1995  1994  1995  1992  1997 
First  (lowest)  39/38  12/26  50/50  0/16  39/35  55/62  35/27 
Second  39/41  40/39  40/41  40/35  39/38  44/50  40/42 
Third  39/41  40/41  40/40  40/40  39/39  42/46  40/44 
Fourth  39/42  40/42  40/40  40/41  39/39  42/46  40/45 
Fifth  45/47  44/45  40/42  40/44  39/40  45/50  45/48 
Source: Luxembourg  Income Study data. 
a.  By males aged 25-54. 
thirty-nine  hours  a week in all income  quintiles.  Other  countries  have  pat- 
terns  that  are somewhat  closer to that  of the United  States. 
The  perception  in the United  States  of a close connection  between  effort 
and  income  or wealth  has deep historical  roots.  It was noted  by Alexis de 
Tocqueville,  who contrasted  it strongly  with the European  association  of 
indolence with the aristocracy.  For example, he wrote, "It is to escape 
this obligation  of work  that  so many  rich  Americans  come to Europe;  there 
they find the debris  of aristocratic  societies among  which idleness is still 
honored."90  At the  extreme,  it is still true  that  the  richest  person  in America 
is the self-made  chairman  of Microsoft,  Bill Gates,  but  the richest  people 
in England  are  Queen  Elizabeth  and  the Duke of Westminster. 
Second, it is entirely  possible that  Americans  have inherited  an ethos 
of hard  work  from  their  Puritan  antecedents,  and  Americans  still seem to 
think  that  laziness  is something  of a sin. The Congregationalists  who set- 
tled New England  were intellectual  descendants  of Calvin,  and  Calvinist 
views are still heard  in the United States. De Tocqueville  describes the 
American  work  ethos  in these  terms:  "[An  American]  would  deem  himself 
disreputable  if he used his life only for living."  Current  survey  evidence 
still supports  this  pro-work  orientation.  For  example,  in the General  Social 
Survey  only 22 percent  of respondents  agreed  that  a job is just a way of 
earning  money,  and 63 percent  said that  they would enjoy having  a pay- 
ing job even if they did not need the money. 
A third  factor  is that  Americans  might  in general  be more  comfortable  than 
Europeans  with  punishing  miscreants,  and  therefore  might  be more  amenable 
90. De Tocqueville  (1835). 
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to the idea  of punishing  welfare  recipients  by cutting  back  on welfare.  The 
view that  Americans  are  more  comfortable  with  punishment,  and  in particu- 
lar  with  punishing  the less fortunate,  than  Europeans  has some  basis  in fact. 
For  example,  the General  Social  Survey  asked  whether  respondents  thought 
that  the  courts  in their  country  punished  criminals  too harshly  or  not  harshly 
enough.  Eighty-six  percent  of U.S. respondents  said  that  the courts  are  not 
harsh  enough,  and  only 4 percent  that  the courts  are  too harsh.  Americans 
overwhelmingly  support  the death  penalty.  The United  States,  as already 
noted,  spends  more  per  capita  on  defense  than  do the  European  countries,  and 
Americans  are  generally  more  enthusiastic  than  Europeans  about  wars  (or 
have  been  since  World  War  II at least).  Richard  Nisbet  and  Dov Cohen  sug- 
gest that  an  American  taste  for retribution  might  have  come from  the fron- 
tier  and  the need to protect  goods when  property  rights  are  uncertain.91  In 
contrast,  two  disastrous  world  wars  fought  on their  homelands,  together  with 
awful  experiences  with  punitive  fascist  regimes,  may  have  discredited  the  use 
of vengeful  punishment  among  Europeans. 
A fourth  possibility is that the view of welfare recipients  as lazy (or 
even cheaters)  is endogenous  and  rooted  in the social isolation  of the poor 
in the United  States.  If Europeans  are  more  likely to know  welfare  recipi- 
ents (both because European  society is relatively more integrated  and 
because there  are more welfare recipients  to get acquainted  with), they 
might  react  negatively  to aspersions  cast on their  integrity.  In the United 
States,  where  welfare  recipiency  is rarer,  it might  be easier  for  anti-welfare 
leaders  to malign  the  character  of welfare  recipients.  Naturally,  this  creates 
a situation  of increasing  returns,  whereby  the  ability  to promote  the  expan- 
sion of a welfare  state  increases  as the welfare  state  itself grows. 
Table  12 presents  our  first  evidence  on mobility  and  support  for  welfare, 
using data from the General  Social Survey.  The regression  reported  in 
column  12-1 estimates  the connection  between  occupational  mobility  and 
support  for more  spending  on welfare.  Occupational  mobility  is defined  as 
the mean  difference  in occupational  prestige  between  the respondent  and 
his or her  father.  We  take  the mean  of this respondent-father  difference  by 
race and  by occupation  group.  (We separate  out the races  because  it may 
well be that  attitudes  about  mobility  are  formed  only on the basis of one's 
own  race.)  We  find  a significant  negative  effect  of occupational  mobility  on 
support  for welfare. This supports  the idea that  people who have them- 
91.  Nisbett and Cohen (1996). 
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Table 12. Explaining  Support for Welfare  in the United States with Income Mobility 
and Behavioral  Variablesa 
Independent  variable  12-1  12-2  12-3 
Black  0.260**  0.202**  0.245** 
(25.39)  (22.89)  (29.25) 
Income  {).016**  {).018**  {).020** 
(11.74)  (17.17)  (19.85) 
Female  0.001  -0.001  0.012* 
(0.19)  (0.10)  (2.30) 
Married  {0.034**  {0.031**  {0.030** 
(4.55)  (5.16)  (5.19) 
No. of children  0.005**  0.006**  0.007 
(2.83)  (3.49)  (4.23) 
High  school education  or less  0.038**  0.036**  0.040** 
(4.41)  (4.75)  (5.57) 
Some college education  0.012  -0.008  -0.002 
(1.37)  (1.03)  (0.23) 
College  graduate  0.050**  0.015**  0.032** 
(4.13)  (1.65)  (3.84) 
Beyond  college  0.144**  0.082**  0.106** 
(7.87)  (6.43)  (8.74) 
Population  of home  city,  0.009**  0.008**  0.008** 
in logarithms  (7.04)  (6.29)  (6.48) 
Mean  occupational  mobilityb  {0.002** 
(6.44) 
Supports  capital  punishment  {0.096** 
(15.13) 
Frequency  of church  attendancec  {0.041** 
(5.08) 
Protestant  {0.025** 
(4.43) 
Summary  statistic 
No. of observations  14,912  18,509  20,718 
R  2  0.10  0.11  0.11 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using data for 1972-98 from the General  Social Survey (see appendix  B). 
a.  The dependent variable for each specification is respondents' opinions on the current  level of welfare spending in their 
state;  possible responses  were "too much"  (scored as 1), "about  right"  (scored as  '2), or "too little"  (scored  as 0). All specifications 
include a constant (not reported).  t statistics are reported  in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 5 percent level, ** at the 
1 percent  level. 
b. The mean difference in occupational  prestige between the respondent  and his or her parent  in a given race and given occu- 
pation group. 
c.  Number  of times a week. 
selves risen  from  poverty  are  more  likely  to think  that  the  poor  can  do like- 
wise, and  therefore  are  only on welfare  because  they are  lazy or cheating 
the system. Of course,  this relationship  might also arise because  greater 
mobility  is associated  with  higher  future  wage growth,  as discussed  in the 
section  on economic  determinants  above.92 
92. This  point  is investigated  by Alesina  and  La Ferrara  (2001). 
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Column  12-2 reports  results  of a regression  that  examines  the relation- 
ship  between  support  for capital  punishment  and  welfare.  This regression 
tests the notion that  people who are more comfortable  with retribution 
are  more  likely to oppose  giving money  to the poor.  We find  an extremely 
strong  relationship  in the United  States  between  supporting  capital  pun- 
ishment  and  opposing  welfare.  The  unexpectedly  high  correlation  between 
these opinions  (16 percent)  may seem hardly  natural.  However,  it makes 
sense if opposition  to welfare  comes from  a desire  to punish  people who 
are  seen as stealing  from  taxpayers. 
Column  12-3 considers  the hypothesis  that  Protestantism  is an impor- 
tant force driving  beliefs about  the poor and about  welfare:  support  for 
increased  welfare  is regressed  on church  attendance  and  on being  a Protes- 
tant.  Both variables  have a statistically  significant  effect. More-religious 
Americans,  and  Protestant  Americans,  are  more  likely to oppose  increased 
spending  on welfare. Protestantism  is also linked to the belief that suc- 
cess results  from  effort. 
To investigate  these issues further,  we again  use the World  Values  Sur- 
vey to examine the distribution  of opinions in Europe and the United 
States.  As argued  earlier,  support  for a country's  current  welfare  policies 
makes  little sense  as a variable  for  cross-country  comparisons.  Instead,  we 
use left-wing  political  attitudes  as our  best proxy  for attitudes  toward  the 
poor.  Within  countries  the correlation  between support  for welfare and 
left-wing  status  is considerable.  The mean  difference  in the proportion  of 
respondents  who are left-wing is 13 percent (30 percent  of Europeans 
versus 17 percent  of Americans  describe  themselves  as left-wing). 
Table  13 reports  a decomposition  of American  and  European  responses 
to three  questions  about  the poor:  whether  the  poor  are  trapped  in poverty, 
whether  luck determines  income, and  whether  the poor are lazy. As dis- 
cussed earlier,  the table shows the large differences  between the United 
States  and  Europe  in the  responses  to these  questions.  For  example,  54 per- 
cent of Europeans  believe  that  the poor  are  unlucky,  whereas  only 30 per- 
cent of Americans  share  that  belief. 
Table 13 also shows the connection  between  these variables  and left- 
wing self-identification.  The connection  between  believing  that  the poor 
are trapped  and  left-wing attitudes  is strong  in the United States:  Ameri- 
cans who describe  themselves  as left-wing make  up 26 percent  of those 
who believe the poor are trapped  in their  poverty,  but only 14 percent  of 
those who hold the contrary  view. The difference  in left-wing  orientation 
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Table 13. Relationship  between Leftist Political Orientation  and Beliefs 
about the Poor 
Percent 
Item  European  Union  United  States 
Identify  themselves  as on the left of 
political  spectrum  30  17 
Believe  poor  are  trapped  in poverty  60  29 
Percent  of the above  who are  on the left  34  26 
Do not believe  poor  are  trapped  in poverty  40  71 
Percent  of the above  who are  on the left  27  14 
Believe luck  determines  income  54  30 
Percent  of the above  who are  on the left  35  18 
Do not believe  luck  determines  income  46  70 
Percent  of the above  who are  on the left  25  16 
Believe  the poor  are  lazy  26  60 
Percent  of the above  who are  on the left  23  11 
Do not believe  the poor  are  lazy  74  40 
Percent  of the above  who are  on the left  34  25 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based on data for 1981-97 from the World  Values  Survey (see appendix  B). 
between  the United  States  and  Europe  drops  from 13 percentage  points  to 
8 percentage  points  within  the group  that  agrees  that  the poor  are  trapped. 
There  is no drop  among  those who believe that  the poor  are  not trapped. 
The connection  between  belief in luck as a determinant  of poverty  and 
left-wing  self-identification  is weaker  in the United  States  than  in Europe. 
Sixteen percent  of Americans  who say that success is due to effort, and 
18 percent of those who say it is due to luck, are self-described left- 
wingers.  This is not much  of a difference.  In Europe  the comparable  num- 
bers are 25 percent  and 35 percent.  Although  there is a huge difference 
between the United States and Europe  in belief in the role of luck, it is 
not the case that  holding belief in the role of effort constant  eliminates 
the U.S.-Europe  difference  in left-wing  self-identification. 
Table 13 also looks at beliefs about  whether  the poor are lazy. Again, 
there is a very large difference between the United States and Europe. 
Sixty percent  of American  respondents,  but  only 26 percent  of Europeans, 
say that  the poor are lazy. However,  at the individual  level there  is little 
connection  between  this  variable  and  left-wing  self-identification.  Holding 
constant  belief in whether  the poor are lazy causes the difference  in left- 
wing self-identification to drop from 13 percentage  points to between 
9 and 12 percentage  points.  These  effects are  not all that  large. 
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As a third  test, we regress  transfers  divided  by GDP  on the share  of the 
respondents  in the country  who say that  success is due to luck  rather  than 
effort.  Figure  6 shows the relationship  graphically.  In this cross-country 
sample  the two variables  have  a correlation  of 0.44. 
Table 14 looks at the determinants  of left-wing attitudes  using data 
across  countries  from  the World  Values  Survey.  We interpret  this variable 
as reflecting  something  like beliefs about  welfare,  which should  abstract 
from  the effect of political  institutions.  In column 14-1 we present  results 
of a basic regression  that  includes  the U.S. dummy  variable  and  controls 
for individual  characteristics  such as age and  race.  We observe  no impact 
of these  controls  on the U.S. dummy:  its coefficient  of -0.125 corresponds 
to the roughly  13-percentage-point  difference  in left-wing  status  between 
the United  States  and  Europe  discussed  earlier.  Variables  that  can explain 
Figure 6. Relationship  between  Social Spending  and Belief That Luck 
Determines  Income 
Social  spending  (percent  of GDP)a 
20  *Belgium 
* Sweden  * Netherlands 
* France 
* Austria 
15  ~~~~~~~~~~Germany  Spain  Denmair 
italy /  Uruguay 
Ireland  a Norway 
Finland 
10  Canada  ngdom 
United  'Cie@Prua 
States  Japan  Chile  * Portugal  Brazil 
*  *Australia  Switzerland 
5  *  Iceland  *Argentina 
Dominican  Turkey 
Republic  *  Peru  PhilipRine4  * VenIezuela  I 
0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7 
Belief that  luck  determines  incomeb 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based on data from the World  Values  Survey. 
a. Average  for 1960-98. 
b. Mean value for country,  measured  as an index from I to 10, with 10 indicating  strongest  belief. Data for 1981-97. 
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Table 14. Regressions  Explaining  Leftist Political Orientationa 
Independent  variable  14-1  14-2  14-3  14-4 
U.S. resident  {0.125**  -0.007  -0.096**  0.047 
(12.14)  (0.02)  (3.31)  (0.25) 
Income  -0.010**  0.010*  {0.009*  -0.010** 
(7.20)  (2.38)  (3.78)  (4.00) 
Years  of education  -0.004**  -0.004**  -0.002  -0.001 
(3.79)  (1.09)  (0.74)  (0.34) 
City  population  0.010**  0.010*  0.010**  0.010** 
(7.43)  (2.36)  (4.29)  (4.13) 
White  0.036**  0.029  0.051**  0.041* 
(4.83)  (1.45)  (3.13)  (2.57) 
Married  {0.026**  {0.025*  -0.030**  {0.029** 
(3.22)  (2.29)  (2.97)  (2.79) 
No. of children  -0.009**  -0.010  {0.010**  -0.011I** 
(3.63)  (1.82)  (3.09)  (3.08) 
Female  {0.044**  -0.042**  -0.043**  {0.041** 
(6.93)  (3.57)  (3.43)  (3.28) 
Racial  fractionalizationb  -0.275  -0.298 
(0.33)  (0.73) 
Mean  belief that  luck  0.541**  0.655** 
determines  incomec  (3.69)  (3.74) 
Summary  statistic 
No. of observations  20,269  19,265  16,478  15,489 
R  2  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using data for 1981-97 from World  Values Survey (see appendix  B). 
a.  The dependent  variable  for each specification is a dummy variable  that equals one when a respondent  identifies himself or 
herself as being on the left of the political spectrum.  All specifications include a constant and dummies for age categories (not 
reported).  Absolute values of robust  t statistics are reported  in parentheses.  * denotes significance at the 5 percent  level, ** at the 
I percent  level. 
b. Probability  that two randomly  selected individuals  from a population  are of different  races. 
c.  See appendix  B for details. 
this difference  in attitudes  toward  redistribution  will cause this difference 
to drop. 
The regression  in column 14-2 controls  for racial  fractionalization  in 
the country,  using the same  racial  variable  discussed  earlier.  This variable 
is available  only at the country  level, and  therefore  we control  for within- 
country  correlation  of the error  terms.  The coefficient  on this variable  is 
quite  large,  but statistically  insignificant.  It also eliminates  the coefficient 
on the U.S. dummy.  This could be interpreted  as indicating that racial 
heterogeneity may explain the entire difference in left-wing attitudes 
between  the United  States  and  Europe,  but  our  statistical  confidence  in this 
claim is weak. 
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The regression  in column 14-3 controls  for the belief that  luck deter- 
mines  income.  Because  we are  quite  wary  about  looking  at the  relationship 
between  two individual-specific  variables  (left-wing  self-identification  and 
beliefs about  luck) that  may really be the same thing, we have used the 
within-occupation, within-country  mean belief that luck determines 
income.  The logic of this is that  the occupation  group  average  may repre- 
sent  the outside  influence  that  affects  peoples'  beliefs but  will not be quite 
as endogenous  as the  respondents'  own  beliefs.  This  has a sizable  effect on 
the U.S. dummy,  reducing  it by 20 percent.  The  regression  in column  14-4 
includes  both  racial  heterogeneity  and  beliefs about  luck versus  effort. 
Our  conclusion  from  this section  is that  we are  very confident  that  race 
is critically important  to understanding  differences  between the United 
States  and  Europe  in attitudes  toward  welfare.  It is also true  that  Americans 
generally  think  that  income  comes from  effort  and  that  welfare  recipients 
are not pulling their weight. This opinion may itself be the outcome of 
racial  factors. 
Conclusion 
Why is redistribution  so much greater  in Europe  than in the United 
States?  We have examined  three  sets of explanations,  which we labeled 
economic, political, and behavioral.  The economic explanations  do not 
explain  much of the puzzle. Before-tax  income inequality  is higher,  and 
the income distribution  appears  to be more skewed,  in the United States 
than  in Europe.  There  does not appear  to be more income uncertainty  in 
Europe,  nor is there  evidence that  the European  tax system is more  effi- 
cient. There  may be more  chance  for upward  mobility  among  politically 
powerful  groups  in the United  States.  Overall,  we think  that  standard  eco- 
nomic models of income redistribution  do a poor  job of explaining  the 
differences  between  the United  States  and  Europe. 
On  the other  hand,  political  variables,  including  the  electoral  system  (in 
particular,  proportionality  and, in the United States, the two-party  sys- 
tem) and  the role of the courts,  are important.  The two-party  system and 
the lack of proportional  representation  in the United  States  created  obsta- 
cles that  blocked  the formation  of a strong  and lasting socialist party.  In 
contrast,  the upheaval  in continental  Europe over the last century has 
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meant  that  no durable  institutions  remained  to protect  property  against 
popular  demand  for redistribution.  Monumental  differences  in the history 
and  geography  of the two regions,  such  as the Civil  War  and  the open  fron- 
tier  in the United  States  during  the  nineteenth  century,  contributed  to a dif- 
ferent  climate  and  different  attitudes  toward  the relationship  between  the 
individual  and  the state. 
The behavioral  explanations  also seem very important.  Racial frag- 
mentation  in the United  States  and  the disproportionate  representation  of 
ethnic minorities  among  the poor clearly  played a major  role in limiting 
redistribution,  and indeed,  racial  cleavages seem to serve as a barrier  to 
redistribution  throughout  the world.  This history  of American  redistribu- 
tion makes  it quite clear that  hostility  to welfare  derives  in part  from the 
fact that  welfare  spending  in the United  States  goes disproportionately  to 
minorities.  Another  important  difference  is that  Americans  dislike redis- 
tribution  because  they  tend  to feel that  people  on welfare  are  lazy,  whereas 
Europeans  tend  to feel that  people on welfare  are  unfortunate.  Apart  from 
the fact that, in the United States, there  is indeed a stronger  connection 
between  effort  and  earnings  than  in Europe,  we do not  know  what  explains 
these  differences  in beliefs. 
Our  bottom  line is that  Americans  redistribute  less than  Europeans  for 
three  reasons:  because  the majority  of Americans  believe that  redistribu- 
tion  favors  racial  minorities,  because  Americans  believe  that  they  live in an 
open and  fair  society and  that  if someone  is poor  it is his or her  own fault, 
and  because the political system is geared  toward  preventing  redistribu- 
tion. In fact, the political  system  is likely to be endogenous  to these  basic 
American  beliefs. 
APPENDIX  A 
Proofs of Propositions 
Proof  of Proposition  1: First,  the impact  of ox  and  X are  clearly  the same,  so 
it is sufficient  to prove that  redistribution  is rising in ox.  We use the fol- 
lowing notation: 
Q(Y0)  = f  [6Y  -  Y(Yo,  t)]  [(1  -  t)Y(Y0,  t) + t6Y]f(E)g(Y?  )d. 
E 
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Taking the derivative of equation 4 yields 
f (Y-YO)Q(YO)= 
Yo 
(Al)  -  [a(YO  ) +  X(YO)]  x 
aa,~  a  Y- Y(Y0,~)  "(  )(0~  +,Y  t]f  (F)g(Yo)dedYo. 
The term multiplying  is obviously negative, so it is sufficient to prove 
that the term on the left-hand side of the equation is positive. 
We  will  prove  this  by  contradiction,  and  we  start by  assuming 
that  f  (Y -  YO  )Q(YO)  < 0,  which  implies  that  f  (Y -  YO  )Q(YO)  < 
YO  Y0>6Y 
f (Y  -  YO)Q(YO).  From equation 4 we know that 
Yo<6Y 
f [i + aO  + (Y -  YO  )(l + a + X)]Q(YO)  = 
(A2)  YO>AY 
-  f  I1  + (xo + (Y^  -  Yo)(I + aX  + X) Q(YO)I 
Yo<8Y 
and both  sides  of  this  equation  are positive,  since  11+  ao + (Y -YO) 
(1+ a + X)]> 0, and  Q(YO)  > 0 for YO  > 6Y (which together  imply that the 
left-hand side is positive, which in turn implies that the right-hand side is 
positive as well). 
Equation  A2 implies that  f Q(YO  )< -  JQ(YO),  because [I + ao + (Y -  YO) 
YoA>  Yo<8Y 
(1+ a + X)]  is declining  in YO,  which in turn  implies (1 -  6)Y  f Q(YO)  < 
Yo>8Y 
(1  6)Y  f Q(YO),  and  since  Y  - YO  < (  - 6)Y for allYO  >  Y and  Y  - YO  > 
Yo<8f 
(1 -6)Yforall  YO<6Y,this  impliesthat f (Y -YO)Q(YO)  <  |(Y YO)Q(YO)- 
YnA>8  Yo<8Y 
This contradicts  (YY  -  YO)Q(YO).  Thus it must be true 
Yn  >8  Yo<8Y 
that  |'(Y  -  lYO)Q(YO)  <  - Y  YO)Q(YO),  and thus 
k 
is positive.  YO>8f  YO<8f  a(x 
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Proof of Proposition  2: When e  = 0, equation  4a is positive  if and  only if 
6  >  YMed/Y 
Proof of Proposition  3: For  any  parameter  X differentiation  yields 
af  [6^-YMed  U  -  t)YMed  (E)  +  t6Y]f ()d? 
(A4)  ax 
f  [x  -  YMed  (E)]  U  )yMed (  )  + ]t6Yjf  (E)d. 
Since  the  terms  multiplying  ac are  positive,  the sign of  aC will be deter- 
af  8  -YMed(?)]U  [(1 -  )YMed  (?)  +  6rY]f  ()d? 
mined  by the sign of  ax  .In the 
case of Ji(YMed),  this equals 
(A5)  f [-OU'(YN  (?)] + [8y-YMed  (I-  t)OU"[YN  (?)]f (?)d?. 
This can be rewritten  as 
(A5')  -of  U'[YN  (?)] +  YN  (O)U"{YN  (E) -  fYU [YN  (?)]}f(?)d?. 
Using the assumption that U'(Y) > -  YU"(Y), or U'(Y) + YU"(Y) > 0, we 
know that  the expression  in the integral  is strictly  positive, and thus the 
entire  term  is negative.  Thus  the level of redistribution  falls with  J1(YMed). 
In the case of 6 the left-hand  side of equation  A4 equals 
(A6)  |YU'[YN  ()]+[6Y-  YMed  (?)jtYU"[YN(?)]f(E)d?, 
which  can be rewritten  as 
J  {YU'[YN  (?)] +  YU"[(YN (?)] 
-[(1  t6)Y  +  UyMed  (0  Yu  [YN (?)]  f (?)  A. 
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Again using U'(Y)  + YU"(Y)  > 0, this term  is positive, and thus  redistri- 
bution  will rise with 6. 
Finally,  considering  0, the left-hand  side of equation  A4 equals 
f {  (  +  E)U'[YN  (?)]  + 
(A8) 
E 
[Y  -  YMed (e)](-  )(  +  ?)U"[YN  (e)]}  f(e)d, 
where ji  =  I9(YMed)  -  YMed.  Rewriting this equation yields 
f (9  +  ?)(-tU'[YN  (?)]  + YN  (E)U"[YN  (?)]  I  + 
(A8W) 
E 
AYU"[YN(?)])f(e)de. 
If the variance  of ? equals zero, this term  is clearly negative as long as 
g > 0, so that  more  uncertainty  leads to decreases  in redistribution.  Like- 
wise, if 1i is sufficiently  negative,  the term  will be strictly  positive, and 
more  variation  will lead  to more  redistribution.  The  problem  is continuous, 
so that  these claims will continue  to hold for as long as the variance  of ? 
is low. If  i ? 0 and  6Y  =  YMed (e), the equation  can be rewritten  as 
(A8")  f  -(j  + E)U`[YN(E)]f(E)de, 
which, from the concavity of U(*), is positive if ? is symmetrically  dis- 
tributed,  and  thus  more  uncertainty  leads to more  redistribution. 
APPENDIX  B 
Data Sources 
Government  Revenue and Expenditure 
All reported  measures,  including  historical  data  and  those  used to con- 
struct  table  4, are  for general  government.  Historical  data  are  provided  by 
Tanzi and Schuknecht  (2000) for the 1870-1960 period and the 2000 
OECD  Economic  Outlook  database  for the 1960-98 period. 
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Tax Rates 
The  tax  rates  shown  in figure  1 are  based  on comparative  data  published 
in OECD,  Taxing  Wages  (2001). For  each country,  the tax rate  schedule  is 
translated  in terms  of the average  earnings  of production  workers.  Only 
central  government  taxes are  taken  into account;  regional  and  local taxes, 
as well as social security  contributions,  are  omitted. 
Social Protection 
The comparative  data on and descriptions  of social security  systems 
in Germany,  Sweden, and the United States are from the German  Fed- 
eral Ministry  of Labour  and Social Affairs,  Social Security  at a Glance, 
2001, and the U.S. Social Security  Administration,  Office of Research, 
Evaluation and Statistics, Social Security Programs in the United States, 
2000, and from comparative  charts  published by both the U.S. Social 
Security  Administration  (Social  Security  Programs  Throughout  the 
World,  1999) and  the Mutual  Information  System  on Social  Protection,  an 
EU agency that gathers information  on the social security systems of 
member countries (Social Security and Social Integration: Comparative 
Tables on Social Protection in the Member States, 2000).  We report data 
on family  benefits,  health  care,  sickness  benefits,  unemployment  benefits, 
disability benefits, and social assistance. Information  on old-age and 
survivors'  pensions  was also available  but  disregarded  for  purposes  of this 
paper. 
Minimum Wages 
The second  and  third  columns  of table 5 report  measures  of minimum 
wages for OECD countries that have national or statutory  minimum 
wages; data are from Eurostat, Minimum Wages in the European Union, 
2001;  OECD Economic  Outlook, no. 66,  1999;  and OECD Main Eco- 
nomic  Indicators  (April 2001). The first column,  reported  from Nickell 
and Layard (1999), adds minimum wages for Germany  and Sweden, 
which have sectoral minimum wages but no overall minimum wage 
policy. 
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Labor Market Regulation 
The labor market  measures  reported  in table 6 are all from publica- 
tions by Nickell (1997) and by Nickell and Layard  (1999) and are con- 
structed  as follows. 
The labor  standards  index is produced  by the OECD  (OECD  Employ- 
ment Outlook, 1994) and extended by Nickell and Layard  (1999) and 
refers  to the strength  of legislation  with regard  to five different  aspects  of 
the labor  market:  working  hours,  fixed-term  contracts,  employment  pro- 
tection, minimum  wages, and employees' representation  rights. Each 
country  is scored  from  0 (no legislation)  to 2 (strict  legislation)  for each 
measure.  The maximum  possible  score  is thus 10. 
Employment  protection  is measured  by an OECD  index referring  to 
the legal framework  concerning  hiring  and  firing  (from  OECD  Jobs Study, 
1994). The maximum  value is 20 and indicates  the strictest  legal provi- 
sions. Minimum  annual  leave is taken  from the same OECD  source  and 
includes  public  holidays. 
The  benefit  replacement  ratio  is the share  of income  replaced  by unem- 
ployment  benefits. Data are from the U.S. Social Security  Administra- 
tion,  Social  Security  Programs  Throughout the World, 1999.  Benefit 
duration  data  are  from  the same  source. 
Economic  Volatility 
The first  four  measures  reported  in table  7 are  from  the OECD  Statisti- 
cal Compendium,  1960-1999, whereas  data  on terms-of-trade  shocks  are 
reported  from  Rodrik's  (1998) database. 
Racial Fractionalization  Measures 
We used the most recent  demographic  measures  whenever  they were 
available  from national  census bureaus  (this was the case for Australia, 
Canada,  France,  India,  Israel,  New Zealand,  Singapore,  and the United 
States;  most of these data  are available  online).  However,  for most coun- 
tries  we used  the  handbook  by David  Levinson  (1998) and  Minority  Rights 
Group International, World  Directory of Minorities, 1997, both of which 
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provide detailed profiles of each country,  including reports  about the 
racial,  ethnic,  linguistic,  and  religious  composition  of the population.  The 
index  is computed  as the  probability  of randomly  drawing  out  of the coun- 
try's population two individuals that do not belong to the same racial 
group. 
General Social Survey 
The  General  Social Survey  (GSS)  is conducted  by the  National  Opinion 
Research  Center  in Chicago  (Davis and  Smith, 1999).  The key dependent 
variable taken from the GSS is a scale (normalized to range between 
0 and 1) indicating to what extent the respondent  supports  increased 
spending on welfare. The question is asked as follows: "We  are faced 
with many  problems  in this country,  none of which can be solved easily 
or inexpensively.  I'm going to name  some of these problems  and  for each 
one I'd like you to tell whether  you think  we're spending  too much  money 
on it, too little money,  or about  the right  amount."  Poverty  is then  one of 
the problems  named. 
Some of the key right-hand  side variables  in our  analysis  are  also taken 
from  the GSS, including  the percentage  of blacks  in the respondent's  own 
state,  the belief that  black  people are  lazy, and  whether  or not the respon- 
dent has had a black person  over for dinner  in the last five years. On the 
laziness  question,  respondents  are asked  to report  their  beliefs about  peo- 
ple of various  races  and  ethnicities.  The question  asks, "Do people  in this 
group tend to be hardworking  or lazy?" and people respond  on a scale 
from 1 to 7, with 7 being the laziest. 
To study  mobility  we use a GSS variable  that  compares  the  respondent's 
own occupational  prestige  with that  of his or her  parents. 
World  Values Survey 
The World Values Survey is produced by the Institute for Social 
Research  at the University  of Michigan  (Inglehart  and others,  2000). We 
use World  Values Survey data to measure how individuals' attitudes 
toward  social spending  vary  and  how such attitudes  correlate  with beliefs 
about social mobility and about the laziness of the poor, and with the 
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respondent's own characteristics. We use data from Belgium,  Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Our dependent variable is a zero-one dummy for whether the respon- 
dent classifies  himself or herself as being on the left side of the political 
spectrum. The survey uses a scale from 1 to 10, and we identify as a left- 
ist anyone who reports a 4 or lower. (The exact question is: "In political 
matters, people  talk of  'the left'  and 'the right.' How would you place 
your views on this scale, generally speaking?") 
We use this question rather  than more direct questions on social spend- 
ing because  all of the latter relate to the appropriateness of the current 
level of spending in one's own country. There are large differences across 
countries in the level  of spending,  and that level  appears to affect how 
people respond to the question. 
Our other variables of interest in the World  Values Survey are responses 
to the following questions: 
Why, in your  opinion, are  there  people in this country  who live in need? Here are 
two opinions:  Which comes closest to your view? 
They are poor because society treats  them unfairly. 
They are poor because of laziness and lack of will power. 
In your opinion, do most poor people in this country  have a chance of escaping 
from poverty,  or is there  very little chance of escaping? 
They have a chance. 
There is very little chance. 
Respondents who choose the first of the two answers are assigned a score 
of zero, and those who choose  the second  are assigned  a score of one. 
The final question asks the respondent to indicate agreement or disagree- 
ment with the following statements: 
In the long run,  hard  work usually brings a better  life. 
Hard work doesn't generally bring success-it's  more a matter of luck and 
connections. 
Responses  are coded on a scale of  1 to 10, with  10 indicating  a strong 
belief in luck. We rescaled this to range between 0 and 1. 
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